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THE EVOLUTION OF LABOUR LAW IN INDIA: AN OVERVIEW AND 
COMMENTARY ON REGULATORY OBJECTIVES AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Richard Mitchell, Petra Mahy and Peter Gahan* 
 
Never before in human history have so few owed so much to so many...A handful of men in this country have 
trained the remaining 99.9 per cent - as strong, as talented, as intelligent in every way - to exist in perpetual 
servitude: a servitude so strong that you can put the key of his emancipation in a man’s hands and he will throw 
it back at you with a curse. You’ll have to come here and see it for yourself to believe it. Every day millions 
wake up at dawn - stand in dirty, crowded buses - get off at their masters’ posh houses - and then clean the 
floors, wash the dishes, weed the garden, feed their children, press their feet - all for a pittance: Aravind Adiga, 
The White Tiger, Atlantic Books, London, 2009, pp. 175-176. 
 
1. Introduction	  
	  
In a recent account of the trends in the regulation of working conditions in Asia and the 
Pacific region it was suggested that there was a lack of in-depth historical research on the 
evolution of labour law in many developing countries.1 India, it seems, may well be a case in 
point. Although there is a great amount of written material on Indian labour law and 
associated topics, much of it is of a highly fragmented nature, comprised of very short articles 
and notes on the very wide range of matters covered in India’s voluminous array of 
employment, social security and labour laws.2 There are also a number of conventional 
labour law texts and commentaries which are descriptive of the labour laws and institutions.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Petra Mahy and Richard Mitchell are in the Department of Business Law and Taxation at Monash University, 
Australia. Peter Gahan is in the Department of Management at The University of Melbourne, Australia. The 
authors wish to acknowledge the contribution by way of very detailed comments on an earlier version of this 
paper provided by Professor Debi Saini of the Management Development Institute, Gurgaon, India. All 
remaining errors in the paper are the responsibility of the authors. 
 
1 D. McCann, ‘The Regulation of Working Conditions in Asia and the Pacific: Flexibility, Fragmentation and 
Worker’s Rights’ in S. Lee and F. Eyraud (eds.), Globalization, Flexibilization and Working Conditions in Asia 
and the Pacific, International Labour Office and Chandos Publishing, Geneva and Oxford, 2008, pp. 90-91. 
2  See the relevant entries in the Index to Indian Legal Periodicals, Vols. 1-49, The Indian Law Institute, 1962-
2011. The major ‘relevant to labour’ periodicals include The Economic and Political Weekly, Labour and 
Industrial Cases, The Labour Law Reporter, and the Manpower Journal.  As we note below (see n. 6) The 
Indian Journal of Industrial Relations also contains scholarly contributions on labour law. As would be 
expected, labour law articles are sometimes included in more generalist Indian legal journals, including those 
published by Indian university law schools. 
3 Leading labour law texts include: G.M. Kothari and A.G. Kothari,  A Study of Industrial Law, Vols. 1 and 2, 
N. M. Tripathi Private Limited, Bombay, 4th edition, 1987; S. Malik, P. L. Malik’s Industrial Law, Vols. 1 and 
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But a search of English language sources on Indian labour law reveals little by way of what 
might be regarded as a unified historical account of its evolution covering both central and 
provincial sources, and its relation to its political, social and economic contexts.4 And, 
strangely for a country whose constitution guarantees certain labour rights and whose laws 
include upwards of 150 separate pieces of labour legislation arising from central and state 
government authorities, there is no specialist labour law journal5 promoting scholarly 
engagement in the field notwithstanding the law’s obvious relevance in political and 
industrial terms.6 
In this paper we are aiming to provide a broad overview of the development of labour law in 
India. Two notes of caution are due. First, the Indian system of labour laws is very extensive 
and dauntingly complex. Our descriptions of the laws (mainly legislation) are very general, 
and are intended only to sketch out the broad parameters of Indian government policy in the 
regulation of employment relationships and labour markets. Secondly, we are drawing 
basically from secondary sources, and attempting to put the development of the law into a 
broader socio-political context. In particular we intend to examine the evolution of Indian 
labour law from two perspectives. The first of these deals with the important time periods 
through which the law has progressed since the earliest regulation of the nineteenth century. 
The second deals with the quality, purpose and impact of Indian labour law. Here we are 
interested not merely in what we think Indian labour law sets out to do, but also particularly 
in the various uncertainties and ambiguities which seem to characterise the way in which 
Indian labour law has been perceived by scholars and experts over the course of its 
development. We conclude with a consideration of what particular aspects of the Indian 
political economy have meant for Indian labour law, and what this might mean for the study 
of labour law more generally. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2, Eastern Book Co., Lucknow, 23rd ed., 2011; S.N. Mishra, Labour and Industrial Laws, Central Law 
Publications, Allahabad, 26th edition, 2011.   
4 A useful recent addition to the literature is the ten volume Labour Regulation in India series, published by the 
Institute for Studies in Industrial Development under the general editorship of T.S. Papola (New Delhi, 2008). 
5 The contents of the Labour Law Journal of India, which has been in publication for more than sixty years, are 
almost entirely comprised of reported case decisions.  
6 According to at least one authority ‘Labor relations in India is defined by law’: V. DeSousa, ‘Colonialism and 
Industrial Relations in India’  in S. Kuruvilla and B. Mundell (eds.), Colonialism, Nationalism and the 
Institutionalization of Industrial Relations in the Third World, JAI Press, Stamford, 1999, at p. 65. However, of 
upwards of 1,400 articles published in the Indian Journal of Industrial Relations between 1965 and 2011, only 
about 25 were focussed on labour law per se. 
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2. The	  Evolution	  of	  Labour	  Law	  in	  India7	  
	  
Discussion of Indian labour law and industrial relations is often divided into discrete time 
periods, reflecting important stages in the evolution of the Indian state as well as stages of 
economic development and policy.8 Writing in 1955, Ornati suggested three key periods in 
the evolution of Indian labour law to that point of time.9 The earliest regulation was largely 
designed as labour control,10 but this was eventually added to by a sequence of factory-type 
regulation, providing for some basic levels of protection, between the 1880s and the 1930s. 
This legislation essentially reflected an accommodation of sorts between the interests of 
British industry, seeking protection for its domestic enterprises against cheap foreign labour, 
and Indian social reformers intent on improving what were regarded as sub-human working 
conditions in Indian factories.11 In the view of some commentators, this early period of labour 
law reform was largely ‘formal or unimportant’ constituting only a ‘minimum of interference 
with the working conditions of labour and the relationship between the employer and the 
worker’.12  
A second period (1937-1947), Ornati suggests, was more creative, and began with the 
emergence of ‘Provincial Autonomy’ in the second half of the 1930s, the focus of the Indian 
Congress Party on worker’s rights (including such matters as standards of living, trade union 
rights, the right to strike and so on), and the introduction of greater uniformity through the 
extension of workplace regulation.13 The third period in Ornati’s analysis begins with the 
critical post-Independence legislation of the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See generally, K. N. Vaid, State and Labour in India, Asian Publishing House, London, 1965, chs. 3 and 5 in 
particular; S. Mishra, Modern Labour Laws and Industrial Relations, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 
1992, pp. 13-18. 
8 See, for example, Van D. Kennedy, ‘The Sources and Evolution of Indian Labour Relations Policy’ (1965) 1 
Indian Journal of Industrial Relations 15; D. Bhattacherjee and P. Ackers, ‘Introduction: Employment Relations 
in India - Old Narratives and New Perspectives’ (2010) 41 Industrial Relations Journal 104; J. J. Thomas, ‘An 
Uneasy Coexistence: The New and the Old in Indian Industry and Services’ in A.P. D’Costa (ed.) A New India: 
Critical Reflections in the Long Twentieth Century, Anthem Press, London and New York, 2010.  
9 O. Ornati, Jobs and Workers in India, Institute of International Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell 
University, Ithaca NY, 1955, at pp. 81-95. 
10 For example, The Workmen’s Breach of Contract Act 1859; The Employers and Workmen’s Act 1860; and 
The Penal Code 1860.  
11 C. Candland, Labor, Democratization and Development in India and Pakistan, Routledge, London, 2007, pp. 
18-20;  DeSousa, above n.6, pp. 65-74. 
12 V. K. R. Menon, ‘The Influence of International Labour Conventions on Indian Labour Legislation’ (1956) 73 
International Labour Review 551, at p. 555. Ornati himself suggests that the earlier period reforms were 
‘conservative and narrow’ when contrasted with the labour law developments of later periods: see above n. 9, at 
p. 89. 
13 See Ornati, above n. 9, at pp. 89-91. 
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Ornati’s analysis would suggest that there was nothing very eventful about early Indian 
labour law, but others have argued that there was important progress made in labour 
legislation in the immediate post-World War One period, pointing specifically to the 
influence of several International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions and the Royal 
Commission on Labour in the 1920s as major advances.14  
For the purposes of present discussion we propose to examine the evolution of labour law in 
India, and the regulatory policy associated with it, across six main periods.15 
Pre-­‐1920s	  
	  
In the very early stages of British colonial control, there was little attention paid to the legal 
organisation of work by the authorities. Labour organisation and the production process 
remained, apart from a few exceptions, a matter of family, land and cultural regulation.16 The 
earliest British regulations related to workers in the government service, including the 
military, and ‘forced labour’ for the performance of public works.17 
However, as we have noted briefly above, from the 1880s onwards there was a succession of 
legislative interventions by the colonial government, mainly in relation to the employment of 
women and children, and concerning hours of work, in factories and mines.18 Much of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See A. Amjad, Labour Legislation and Trade Unions in India and Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2001, at p. 36; Menon, above n. 12, at p. 555; R. K. Das, ‘Labour Legislation in Indian States’ (1938) 38 
International Labour Review 794; K. Sankaran, ‘Labour Law in South Asia: The Need for an Inclusive 
Approach’  in T. Tekle (ed.), Labour Law and Worker Protection in Developing Countries, Hart/International 
Labour Office, Oxford and Geneva, 2010, at p. 227. 
15 A different scenario in terms of periodisation in the evolution of Indian labour policy is presented by Shyam 
Sundar: see K. R. S. Sundar, ‘State in Industrial Relations System in India: From Corporatist to Neo-Liberal?’ 
(2005) 48 Indian Journal of Labour Economics 917. See also Mishra, above n.7, at pp. 13-18; and E. Hill, ‘The 
Indian Industrial Relations System: Struggling to Address the Dynamics of a Globalizing Economy’ (2009) 51 
Journal of Industrial Relations 395.  
16 These continue to be highly significant factors in the organisation and regulation of labour. For a detailed 
study of one Indian region see: J. G. Scoville, M. Toha and S. Triparthi, ‘Ethnicity, Caste, Religion and 
Occupational Structure in Traditional Activities: A Preliminary View from North India’  in J. G. Scoville (ed.), 
Status Influences in Third World Labor Markets, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1991. See also, S. Thorat and K. S. 
Newman (eds.), Blocked by Caste: Economic Discrimination in Modern India, Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi, 2010; B. Harriss-White and N. Gooptu,’ Mapping India’s World of Unorganized Labour’ (2001) 37 
Socialist Register 89; M. B. Das and P.V. Dutta, ‘Does Caste Matter for Wages in the Indian Labour Market?’ 
Social Development Unit, World Bank, 2007.  
17 For a discussion of the early origins of labour law in India see, M. R. Anderson, ‘Work Construed: Ideological 
Origins of Labour Law in British India to 1918’ in P. Robb (ed.), Dalit Movements and the Meaning of Labour 
in India, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1993. See also P. Robb, Peasants, Political Economy, and Law, 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2007, ch. 8. 
18 These include the Factories Acts of 1881, 1891 and 1911: see DeSousa, above n. 6, at pp. 68-74. Legislation 
in the mining industry commenced with the Indian Mines Act 1901. 
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legislation was the result of various government-initiated enquiries.19 However, the 
legislation made only very slight inroads into working practices in these industries, and was 
of limited impact insofar as it applied only selectively.20 Regulation in the plantation sector 
was focussed principally upon matters relating to labour supply and the problems of the 
indentured labour system.21 
Post-­‐World	  War	  One	  and	  the	  1920s	  
	  
As we noted, there is some disagreement about the importance of this period.22 Several 
factors had combined to alter the industrial and political landscape, including the emergence 
of a strong nationalist movement, the rapid development of trade unions (most importantly 
the formation of the All India Trade Union Congress in 1920), and the emergence of 
Communist influence in the labour movement following the successful Bolshevik revolution 
in Russia in 1917.23 At the same time the newly created ILO began to have an influence on 
labour policy in India.24 
Much of the legislation of this period was a continuation of the ‘factory’-style regulation of 
the pre-war period, dealing with hours of work, rest periods, female and child protections, 
health and safety and so on. Typical protective legislation of the period includes the Factories 
Act 1922, the Mines Act 1922, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1923, much of it 
responding to the ratification of various relevant ILO conventions by the colonial Indian 
government.25 
However, even if this body of legislation is correctly characterised as ‘unimportant’26 two 
further enactments in this period point to what has been described as the emergence of a more 
modern approach to the regulation of industrial relations: the Trade Unions Act 1926 and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 These included the Labour Commission set up by the Governor of Bombay in 1875, the Bombay Factory 
Commission of 1884, the Government of India Factory Commission of 1890, the Textile Factory Committee 
1906 and the Factory Labour Commission of 1907. See generally R. K. Das, ‘Labour Legislation in India’ 
(1930) 22 International Labour Review 599.   
20 The Factories Act of 1881, for example, only applied to premises using electrical power with 100 or more 
employees. The Factories Act of 1891 applied to premises with 50 or more employees.      
21 See generally Das, above n. 19. Early legislation addressing problems in the plantation sector includes the 
Assam Labour and Emigration Act of 1901, and the Assam Labour and Immigration (Amendment) Act of 1915.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
22 See above n. 12 and associated text. 
23 See Amjad, above n. 14, at pp. 33-38; Candland, above n. 11, at pp.18-19. 
24 See in particular Menon, above n. 12. 
25 See Amjad, above n. 14, pp. 33-47; DeSousa, above n.6, at pp. 79-81. The Workmen’s Compensation Act was 
renamed the Employee’s Compensation Act in 2010. 
26 See above n. 12, and associated text. 
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Trade Disputes Act 1929.27 The regulatory framework set down in these two provisions 
continues formally to underpin the collective labour law system of present day India. 
The Trade Unions Act 1926 provided for the registration of trade unions (though registration 
was not made compulsory), gave unions a legal status, and extended some protections against 
civil and criminal liability in the course of industrial disputes. The Act was limited in certain 
respects (for example unregistered unions were excluded from the Act’s protections), and the 
legislation provided no support for a collective bargaining system as such, insofar as there 
was no obligation upon employers to bargain with unions (even registered unions) in the 
course of an industrial dispute, nor, in the case of such bargaining, was there any legal 
obligation to bargain in good faith. The Trade Disputes Act 1929 placed severe limitations 
upon the right to strike, and provided for the compulsory reference of industrial disputes to a 
conciliation board or a court of enquiry. The outcomes of the reference, however, were not 
binding upon the parties. 
Both pieces of legislation were strongly criticised by sections of the trade union movement, 
including the All India Trade Union Congress.28 
The	  1930s	  
	  
In the context of world economic depression and the associated rise in unemployment, there 
was also in this period continued agitation for Indian independence in which the All India 
Trade Union Congress was playing a major role.29 Mass dismissals were accompanied by a 
renewed wave of strikes, especially as the economic depression took hold through 1928 and 
1929. Against this background, the British government established the Royal Commission on 
Labour in India on the 4th July 1929. The Commission was effectively boycotted by the 
Indian labour movement, the All India Trade Union Congress pointing to the British 
Imperialist government’s ‘open and brutal attack upon the trade union movement by means 
of repressive legislation...’ and its lack of ‘bona fides’ in establishing the Commission.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Amjad, above n. 14, at ch. 4. 
28 Amjad, above n. 14, at pp. 36-39. 
29 See Amjad, above 14, at pp. 36-40. The British colonial government favoured the less nationalistic Indian 
Federation of Labour: see S. K. Sen, Working Class Movements in India, 1885-1975, OUP, New Delhi, 1994. 
30 See Amjad, above n. 14, at p. 46. 
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The Commission handed down its Report31 in 1931, still a period of continued job cuts, wage 
reductions, and ongoing industrial unrest and strike action.  But during the 1930s, two major 
factors began to put some further shape on Indian labour law. First, many of the outcomes of 
the Report of the Royal Commission made their way into a string of new labour legislation 
between 1933 and 1939. Menon estimates that of 24 pieces of labour legislation introduced 
by central and provincial governments between 1932 and 1937, 19 arose from the Royal 
Commission’s recommendations.32 Virtually all of this new law was in the nature of 
protective factory and mines regulation to do with wages, hours of work, and compensation 
of one sort or another, similar to earlier periods. One exception was the Payment of Wages 
Act 1936, which empowered the employer to deduct wages of employees absent from work in 
concert, and without reasonable cause. A further example was the Trade Disputes 
(Amendment) Act 1938, which authorised provincial governments to appoint conciliation 
officers to assist in the settlement of disputes.  
Secondly, and potentially more important, were the developments which followed from the 
Government of India Act 1935. The heightened profile given to provincial autonomy33 made 
possible under these new constitutional arrangements gave rise to popular expectation that 
more ‘labour’- or ‘union’-friendly policies would emerge at the provincial government 
level,34 and this in turn gave rise to further concentrated periods of extensive strike action.35 
Even prior to the 1935 Act, several provincial governments had begun to experiment with 
labour law, much of it an important contribution to the development of better working 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India, HMSO, London, Cmnd. 3883, 1931. 
32 See Menon, above n. 12, at p. 557 
33 The Royal Commission on Labour had ‘recommended that legislative authority should remain with the central 
Government, though the states could also be given jurisdiction provided that no legislation was undertaken by 
the states without the previous concurrence of the central government and that such legislation did not impair or 
infringe the central Government’s legislation’: Menon, above n. 12, at p.556. As a matter of constitutional law, 
legislative power over labour and employment relations had been largely shared concurrently by both Central 
and State governments since 1919, and hence the Royal Commission was merely recommending the 
continuance of existing arrangements: see Menon, above n. 12, at pp. 552-554.  This legal division of power was 
also continued in the Constitution of India which came into effect in 1950, following the securing of Indian 
independence from Britain in 1947. Under such legal arrangements Central and State governments have 
continued to legislate for labour relations. However, there has been ongoing debate over the years concerning 
the problems of co-ordination and uniformity of labour laws due to the overlap of powers: see Sir A. C. 
Chatterjee, ‘Federalism and Labour Legislation in India’ (1944) 49 International Labour Review 415;  and, Das, 
above n. 19 at p. 621 emphasising lack of uniformity and other problems, and G. B. Pai, Labour Law in India, 
Butterworth, New Delhi, 2001, emphasising the capacity in these shared arrangements for flexibility in labour 
market regulation. This issue is pursued further in Section 3 of the paper: see below nn. 110-119 and associated 
discussion. 
34 Amjad, above n. 14, at pp. 49-50. 
35 Ibid. 
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conditions in workplaces.36 Not all of this, however, was particularly directed to creating a 
more favourable environment for combined labour activity. One important instance was the 
introduction of the Trade Disputes (Conciliation) Act 1934 by the provincial government of 
Bombay.37 Whilst novel insofar as it was designed to effect changes to collective labour 
relations (by providing for the appointment of a Labour Officer to represent the interests and 
grievances of workers in the cotton mills), the 1934 Act seems to have been aimed mainly at 
heading off communist influence among the labour movement following many years of 
decline in the Bombay-based textile industries and a major strike earlier in that year.38 
However, more adventurous legislation followed after the election of more popular provincial 
governments in the wake of the Government of India Act 1935. The introduction of the 
Industrial Disputes Act 1938 by the Bombay provincial government, for example, among 
other things made some move in towards the imposition of a legal obligation on the part of 
employers to recognise trade unions.39 Again it is necessary to note, however, that these were 
largely limited measures which were not greeted with general approval by the Indian trade 
union movement. The All India Trade Union Congress described the 1938 Bombay Bill as 
‘uncalled for, reactionary, prejudicial and harmful to the interest of the workers [and] 
“calculated to create slave unions”’.40 
In general it appears that the expectations created in the popular election of provincial 
governments remained largely unfulfilled. 
World	  War	  Two	  and	  the	  Pre-­‐Independence	  Period	  
	  
Regulation in the World War Two period appears against the background of considerable 
industrial unrest and strike action against the conditions and affects of the war itself. These 
circumstances brought into being several pieces of legislation (at Central and State level) 
designed to secure labour co-operation in support of the war effort. This legislation included 
passage in 1941 of s. 49A of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, granting power to the 
Bombay government to refer industrial disputes to compulsory arbitration by an Industrial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See Das, above n. 14.  
37 Similar style legislation on industrial disputes, strikes and so on was also introduced in Indore, Cochin and 
other Indian States during the 1930s: see Das, above n. 14, at p. 816-817. 
38 See Amjad, above n. 14, at p. 49; D. Kooiman, ‘Labour Legislation and Working Class Movement: Case of 
Bombay Labour Office, 1934-37’ (1981) 16 Economic and Political Weekly 1807; M. D. Morris, ‘Labor 
Discipline, Trade Unions, and the State in India’ (1955) 63 Journal of Political Economy 293. 
39 See Amjad, above n. 14, at pp. 50-52. 
40 Amjad, above n. 14, at p. 52. 
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Court, and banning all strikes and lockouts prior to arbitration. Much of this restrictive 
legislation in the Bombay province was continued after the war ended in the form of the 
Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946.41 Other relevant legislation included the Central 
government’s Essential Services Act 1941, and the Defence of India Rules (Rule 81-A, 
introduced in 1942, and Rule 56-A, introduced in 1943). Each of these sets of provisions42 
laid down severe restrictions against strikes, and other forms of industrial action, in the 
course of industrial disputes, including industrial action on the part of employers in some 
cases. General and political strikes were also targeted.43 The provisions of Rule 81-A in 
particular were continued after the war as part of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, and, as is 
noted in subsequent sections of this paper,  have remained a core part of the legislation 
governing industrial disputes and bargaining since that time. 
To greater or lesser extent, the Trade Disputes Act 1929, its successor the Trade Disputes Act 
1947, and earlier provisions such as the Bombay Act of 1934, were essentially designed to 
enable government agencies to investigate industrial disputes over relevant terms and 
conditions of employment, and to settle them in appropriate cases.44 But generally the terms 
of this legislation were historically directed more towards the control of labour than towards 
the settlement issue. Certainly there was little or nothing in these various provisions which 
facilitated the development of collective bargaining in a British- or American-style model. 
While strikes and lockouts were strictly controlled, the state, at both Central and State levels, 
exercised strong controls over the circumstances in which disputes might be referred to 
adjudication, the industries to which the legislation applied, and which unions might be 
permitted to notify such disputes.45 
The overall impact of this was, then, one of limitation and exclusion. The Industrial Disputes 
Act 1947, for example, applied (and applies) generally to ‘workmen’ in ‘industries’. 
‘Workmen’ excluded various categories of workers engaged in particular occupations, or in 
managerial and administrative capacities, and so on.46 Whereas the term ‘industry’ has now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Amjad, above n. 14, p. 55. 
42 For brief accounts see Amjad, above n. 14, at pp. 54-57. 
43 In India, many forms of industrial action are unlawful, and much industrial action is correspondingly unlawful 
in practice: see generally, C.K. Johri, ‘India’ in R. Blanpain (ed.) International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands, Supplement 262, 
December 2002, at paras. 626-652. 
44 See the discussion in Section 3 of the paper around nn. 203-217. 
45 Amjad, above n. 14, at pp. 58-61. 
46 See for discussion, B. R. Sharma, ‘Managerial Employees and Labour Legislation’ (1992) 28 Indian Journal 
of Industrial Relations 1. 
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been interpreted quite broadly, many types of employment, including workers in government 
departments and services, and domestic and agricultural workers are still excluded. Similarly 
the Trade Unions Act 1926 also contained important limitations on its coverage.47  It has been 
said of the system set up under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 that ‘the freedom of 
industrial action on the part of workers [is] more illusory than real’ and that the ‘provisions of 
the law [operate] to restrict the options available to the side represented by the workers’.48 
What collective bargaining there was, developed without state support and, not surprisingly, 
evolved almost entirely in the formal (or organised) sectors of the economy.49 These are 
largely confined to the public and large corporate sectors and constitute about 3 per cent or 
less of the workforce in each case.50 
Most scholars have noted that the path taken in the evolution of labour law in India in the 
post-1945 period basically followed the pattern established earlier in the restrictive policies of 
the colonial government and in particular the legislation of the war years.51 Only in a few 
States were there exceptions made to the overall discretionary power of government to refer 
or not to refer disputes for adjudication,  and in only a few States did laws emerge which 
created some sort of obligation upon employers to recognise trade unions. One such provision 
was the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 which, building upon the earlier (and much 
criticised) attempts in the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938, distinguished several types 
of unions, and extended to some of those unions the right to represent workers in particular 
industries and areas.52  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See generally, Johri, above n. 43, at paras. 125-152. 
48 Amjad, above n. 14, pp. 60 and 61. 
49 See T. Roy, Rethinking Economic Change in India, Routledge, London, 2005, at p. 179. Although India has 
never ratified the key ILO Conventions pertaining to Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, it has 
been pointed out that as a member of the organisation it has a general responsibility to support these rights from 
an ethical standpoint: see R. Gopalakrishnan and L. Tortell, ‘Access to Justice, Trade Union Rights and the 
Indian Industrial Disputes Act, 1947’ (2006) 22 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations 529, at pp. 542-543. 
50 We are dealing with this question very generally here. The issue of what constitutes the ‘organised’, the 
‘semi-organised’ and the ‘unorganised’ sectors of the Indian economy, and the relationship of these concepts 
with the idea of the ‘informal’ economy, is very complicated and quite unclear. Not surprisingly this has 
significant implications for how one characterises Indian labour law as a whole: see Sankaran, above n. 14, at 
pp. 230-231; Johri, above n. 43, at paras. 245-248, and paras. 654-682. The issue is pursued further in Section 3 
of the paper: see nn. 183-194 and associated discussion. 
51 See, for example, Sundar, above n. 15, at p. 920; Gopalakrishnan and Tortell, above n. 49, at p. 537. 
52 See K. R. Shyam Sundar, Impact of Labour Regulations on Industrial Development and Employment: A Study 
of Maharashtra, Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi, 2008, pp. 66-68; Johri, above n. 43, 
at paras. 551-554. There are similar laws in other Indian States: for example, the Indian Trade Unions (Madhya 
Pradesh Amendment) Act 1960.  
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At the same time, however, there was a continued strengthening of the protective regulation 
applying to individual worker’s rights during this period. One example is the Industrial 
Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 which required employers to provide their 
employees with clear terms and conditions of employment according to the items set down in 
a Schedule to the Act and certified by the relevant authority. Other major statutes of this 
period included the Factories Act 1948 and the Minimum Wage Act 1948. Much of this body 
of regulation, as we have noted also in the case of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, was (and 
remains) limited in its application because it was applied only selectively to certain kinds of 
business establishments, and, in respect of some provisions, only to businesses of a certain 
size as determined by the number of employees. This is a common theme in Indian labour 
law, with obvious implications for the legitimacy of the labour law system as a whole.53  
Post-­‐Independence,	  1948	  Onwards	  
	  
In the immediate post-war period it was agreed that the Indian Central government would be 
primarily responsible for labour legislation, and the promotion of labour’s interests, reflecting 
a five-year plan of development ‘dealing with all phases of the worker’s life, of housing, 
welfare, work, better working conditions, and fair wages’.54 Many of these social values were 
articulated in the Constitution of India 1950, particularly its commitment to economic, 
political and social justice in the Preamble, and its general egalitarian conception of national 
development.55 
Consistent with this socio/political outlook, we have noted the introduction of a raft of 
protective legislation in the form of the Factories Act 1948, and the Minimum Wages Act 
1948. Important also to note are the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1948, 
which among other things sought to ‘decasualise’ dock labour, the Employees’ State 
Insurance Act 1948, providing for an insurance system for employees in cases of sickness, 
maternity, injury and death, the Plantations Labour Act 1951, which sought to regulate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See Sankaran, above n. 14. See further nn. 179-182 below, and associated discussion. Some detailed examples 
of the complexity and rigidity of various labour law regulations are provided in B. Debroy, ‘Issues in Labour 
Law Reform’ in B. Debroy and P. D. Kaushik (eds.), Reforming the Labour Market, Academic Foundation, 
New Delhi, 2005, at pp. 42-55. 
54 Ornati, above n. 9, at p. 92.  
55 The Indian Constitution 1950 contains specific goals relating to labour, including the ‘right to work’, ‘just and 
humane conditions of work’, a ‘living wage’ and a ‘decent standard of life’ in addition to the right to form trade 
unions: see Constitution of India 1949 ss. 14, 15, 19, 39, 41, 43 and 43A in particular. For further discussion see 
R. Gopalakrishnan, ‘Enforcing Labour Rights Through Human Rights Norms: The Approach of the Supreme 
Court of India’ in C. Fenwick and T. Novitz (eds.), Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and 
Regulation, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2010. 
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conditions of work and provide welfare measures for India’s high employment industries in 
tea and rubber plantations, and the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions 
Act 1952, one of the most important pieces of legislation in India's social security system. 
It follows from what we have said earlier, however, that this period did not mark out a 
completely new approach to the issue of labour regulation in India. When it came to the 
regulation of collective labour relations in particular, the restrictive policies of government 
control which had characterised the colonial and immediate post-war period continued to 
hold sway. As various authorities have noted, the major influence on the formation of post-
independence labour and economic policy was the priority given to government-directed 
‘nation building’ - in which the need for trade union co-operation in securing  industrial 
peace and labour support for industrialisation and economic development  (economic 
nationalism) was paramount. 56 
Consequently the development of labour law in India continued to follow the dual pattern 
already identified. In support of the state planned and organised economy,57 the Indian 
government continued its strong interventionist role in industrial relations. The laws 
regulating trade unions and industrial disputes remained largely fixed on the model set by the 
legislation introduced over the period from 1926 to 1947,58 and this in turn had certain 
implications for the Indian industrial relations system. While trade union organisation was 
legally sanctioned, collective bargaining (at least nominally) ‘recognised’,59 and strikes and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 C. P. Thakur, Labour Policy and Legal Framework in India: A Review, Institute for Studies in Industrial 
Development, New Delhi, 2008, at p.8; Sundar, above n. 15, at pp. 920-921; Amjad, above n. 14, at p. 133; S. 
Ghose, ‘Alternate Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in India - A Study of Industrial Adjudication’ in A. 
Sivananthiran and C. S. Venkata Ratnam (eds.), Prevention and Settlement of Disputes in India, ILO, New 
Delhi, 2003, at p. 83; Sankaran, above n. 14, at pp. 226-227. Such an outlook has retained currency even in 
more recent times: see C.S. Venkata Ratnam (ed.), Industrial Relations in Indian States, Indian Industrial 
Relations Association/Global Business Press, New Delhi, 1996; Thomas, above n. 8.  
57 In the early period of political independence the Indian government established strong controls over the 
nation’s economy in an avowedly ‘socialistic’ stance. This included the establishment of state monopolies or 
controls over industries considered vital to the development of the economy. This policy was formulated as part 
of the 1948 Industrial Policy Resolution and articulated in various Five Year plans introduced sequentially from 
the late 1940s onwards. In 1956 the industries brought under the control of the Indian government were 
expanded considerably, and included, among others, iron and steel, transport, arms and defence equipment, 
mining, electrical power, and telecommunications. The government’s policy also included various supports for 
the development of private industry including tariff protection. See generally, A. S. Mathur, Labour Policy and 
Industrial Relations in India, Ram Prasad and Sons, Agra, 1968, at ch. 2; R. Mohan, ‘Industrial Policy and 
Controls’ in B. Jalan (ed.), The Indian Economy: Problems and Prospects, Penguin, New Delhi, 2004. 
58 Attempts in the post-war period to alter the law to provide for a more collective bargaining-oriented system 
were unsuccessful: see Sundar, above n. 15, at p. 922.  
59 At least to the extent that a ‘settlement’ arrived at through a direct bargaining process was recognised 
pursuant to a 1956 amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act 1947: viz. a written agreement ‘between the 
employer and the workmen, arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings’ (s. 18(1) of the 
Act). Such a settlement has to be filed with the appropriate authorities. This was in no sense a commitment by 
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lockouts to a degree legalised and regulated, the level of state intervention in the actual 
industrial relations process, and the emphasis given to the maintenance of ‘industrial peace’60 
effectively circumscribed the possibility that collective bargaining might develop as the 
primary form of industrial relations in India61: in effect ‘[c]ollective bargaining was held to 
be incompatible with economic planning’.62  
Overall the law on bargaining has changed little since these formative days, although in an 
important amendment to the Trade Union Act in 2001 it was provided that trade unions were 
required to have at least 100 members or to represent at least 10% of the workforce in order 
to secure registration under the Act, thereby making the formation and legalisation of unions 
far more onerous than had previously been the case.63 As noted earlier, some States did move 
to provide unions with a right to recognition, and some subsequent legislation made the 
refusal to bargain on the part of an employer an ‘unfair labour practice’, more or less making 
the duty to bargain legally obligatory. Probably the best example of this legislation is the 
Maharashtra Recognition of Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act 1971, 
which supplemented the Industrial Relations Act 1946 of Bombay,64 although that legislation 
was limited in its application to nine industries only. In 1982 the Indian Central government 
amended the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 introducing the concept of the ‘unfair labour 
practice’ into national labour law.65 This legislation outlawed various practices by employers, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Indian government to the pursuit of a ‘collective bargaining’-led industrial relations policy, merely a 
recognition and sanctioning of what might transpire in the settlement of a dispute. 
60 Thakur, above n. 55, at p. 35. S. Visweswaiajah, ‘Discretionary Referrals: Compulsory Adjudication and the 
Industrial Disputes Act 1947’ (1990) 32 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 1, at p. 3. 
61 See Johri, above n. 43, paras. 574-578;  Sankaran, above n. 14, at pp.  238-239. The same point has been 
made about earlier legislation such as the Trade Disputes (Conciliation) Act 1934 of Bombay: see Kooiman, 
above n. 38, at p. 1817. 
62 Sundar, above n. 15, at p. 921. Collective bargaining in the 1950s was often viewed in India as exhibiting ‘the 
law of the jungle’; see E. A. Ramaswamy, Power and State, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1984, ch.2. 
As noted above (see n. 49) India has not ratified the ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and the Right 
to Organise (Convention 87), nor the Convention on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
(Convention 98). Legislation providing for the compulsory recognition of trade unions by employers upon order 
of a labour court was passed by the Indian Central government in the form of the Trade Unions (Amendment) 
Act in 1947. That legislation was largely based on the system of collective bargaining in the USA. However, the 
legislation was never given legal effect: see G. M. Advani, ‘State Intervention in Labour Relations: Canada and 
India’ (1961) 19 Faculty of Law Review (University of Toronto) 23, at p. 25, and, B. T. Kaul, ‘Pitfalls in the 
Industrial Relations Law in India’ in S. N. Singh (ed.), Law and Social Change: Essays on Labour Law and 
Welfare Research Methodology and Environmental Protection, P. G. Krishnan Memorial Foundation, Delhi, 
1990,  at p. 102.  
63 Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2001 (Act 31 of 2001), s. 5 (which inserted s. 9A into the Trade Unions Act, 
1926).  
64 For brief accounts of this legislation see Johri, above n. 43, para. 555; Sundar, above n. 52, at pp. 68-69. 
65 Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 1982. The proscribed ‘unfair labour practices’ are listed in the Fifth 
Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. Originally similar provisions had been proposed as part of 
amendments to the Trade Unions Act in 1947. However, these proposals came to nought in effect: see Advani, 
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unions and workers designed to disrupt the legitimate processes of dispute settlement under 
the Act. The refusal by an employer to bargain collectively in good faith with the recognised 
trade union was listed as an unfair practice. Whilst on its face this provision might seem to 
have amounted to a major breakthrough in collective bargaining law in India, it does not 
appear to be regarded as particularly important by Indian labour law scholars,66 perhaps 
principally because it has had little impact in practice. What collective bargaining there is in 
India, and it does exist at all levels and across many industries,67 has evolved in a de facto 
sense, and, as noted earlier, has been largely limited to the public, and corporate,68 sectors of 
the economy. In the mid-1990s the proportion of Indian workers covered by collective 
bargaining agreements was estimated to be lower than five per cent.69  
On the other hand, Indian labour law continued to develop in a second dimension; that is, in 
respect of the relations between the employer and the individual worker. Here we can identify 
two main categories of intervention. The first concerns the continued regulation for protective 
labour standards which took place at both Central and State levels.70 We have already noted 
the continuation of this pattern in the post-World War Two period, and, as Sundar has 
pointed out,71 the ongoing regulation for minimum wages, equal pay, social security and 
insurance, maternity benefits, health and safety, leave and holidays, housing and so on, 
occupied much of the regulatory space which was taken up in the contents of collective 
agreements in industrialised Western countries.  
The second area of development concerns employment security. Originally the termination 
of, or dismissal from, employment was not an appropriate subject of an individual ‘industrial 
dispute’ pursuant to the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, and there was thus little limitation on 
the employer’s right to fire an employee as it saw fit,72 other than a requirement that 
appropriate notice be given.73 Nor did the legislation place limitations upon the power of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
above n. 62 at pp. 24-25; C. Myers, Labor Problems in the Industrialization of India, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Massachusetts, 1958, at ch. 8. 
66 For example, it is not mentioned in Amjad’s brief discussion of the law on unfair labour practices: see Amjad, 
above n. 14, at ch. 12; and it is dismissed as unimportant in Johri, above n. 43, at para. 634. 
67 See generally C. S. Venkata Ratnam, ‘Economic Liberalization and the Transformation of Industrial Relations 
Policies in India’ in A. Verma, T. A. Kochan and R. D. Lansbury (eds.), Employment Relations in the Growing 
Asian Economies, Routledge, London, 1995, at pp. 281-285. 
68 See above n. 49. 
69 International Labour Organization, Organization, Bargaining and Dialogue for Development in a Globalizing 
World, Governing Body, 279th Session, Geneva, 2000. 
70 See generally Menon, above n. 12.  
71 Sundar, above n. 15, at p. 921. 
72 Amjad, above n. 14, at pp. 98-99. 
73 Notice was required under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946. 
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employer to retrench or lay off redundant workers. However, pursuant to amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act in 1953, 1976 and 1982 the Central government began gradually to 
introduce important new regulations pertaining to retrenchments, lay-offs, and plant and 
industry closures. These regulations, including the all important Chapters VA and VB of the 
Act required, inter alia, permission by the appropriate authorities for mass redundancies and 
firm closures, minimum notice periods and further relief in the form of compensation.74  
As far as individual dismissals are concerned, a 1965 amendment to the Industrial Disputes 
Act created a right in an individual employee to notify an ‘industrial dispute’ over his or her 
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or other form of termination, whether or not that person 
was represented by a trade union.75 A subsequent amendment, in 1971, empowered the 
Industrial Tribunals and the Labour Court to investigate the dismissal of employees, and 
make appropriate orders, including reinstatement and compensation, where the dismissal was 
found to be unfair.76 As a consequence of these legal changes, the Labour Court and other 
tribunals developed a general broad discretion to review the dismissal of workers and to 
award relief according to notions of substantive and procedural injustice. In 1976, 
amendments to the Act substantially increased (from one month to three months) the amount 
of notice required to be given to certain categories of employees who had been in continuous 
service for at least one year,77 and prohibited the dismissal of workers by way retrenchment, 
lay-off, or industry closure in factories, mines and plantations employing 300 or more 
persons (later reduced to 100 or more in 1982) without permission of the appropriate 
government.   
Other legislation introduced in the 1970s and into the 1980s consolidated this evolving 
protective framework of laws for employees engaged in the regulated (formal)78 sectors of 
the economy. Aside from further strengthening the law on dismissal, major legislation was 
introduced by the Central government in 1970 which strictly limited and regulated the use of 
contract  and agency labour.79 Further, the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1982, in 
addition to declaring certain collective behaviours by both employers and unions to be ‘unfair 
labour practices’ declared certain hiring practices, such as the continuing employment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See Johri, above n. 43, at Part II, Ch. 5.  
75 Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 1965, s. 2-A.  
76 See Johri, above n. 43, at Part I, Ch. 4.  
77 This is now Chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. 
78 See n. 50 above and n. 184 below and associated discussion. 
79 The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970. 
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workers on casual or temporary contracts with ‘the object of depriving them of the status and 
privileges of permanent workmen’, also to be unfair.80 
Overall, then, the post-Independence period was, at least at the level of the individual worker 
in the regulated sector, clearly a period of important consolidation in employment protection. 
Not only the Central government, but also several of the State governments, played an 
important role in this development.81 In his study of the impact of Indian labour regulation on 
unemployment, Sarkar notes that in the period from 1970 to 2006 there were changes in only 
nine of 40 variables used in one quantitative study of Indian labour law.82 Of those 9 changed 
variables, 8 were numerically assessed to have been of advantage to labour and thus of 
disadvantage to management. Of those 8, 7 pertained to the individual employment rights 
(employment status and security) of workers. What this says about the overall protective 
strength of Indian labour law is problematical, and we address this issue in the following 
section of the paper. But what it does confirm is that in the long sweep of post-war evolution 
in Indian labour law, Indian governments were concerned principally with the construction 
and maintenance of a ‘floor of rights’ for certain classes of labour, and at the same time 
restricting  the industrial, if not the political, development of collective labour influence. 
The	  Struggle	  for	  Liberalisation:	  Post-­‐199083	  
	  
Whatever might be said with accuracy about the protective qualities of the Indian labour law 
system, it is certainly the case that there is a widespread perception that both the extent and 
content of regulation in the Indian labour market has placed severe restrictions on the 
capacity of the Indian economy to develop, particularly in the context of economic 
globalisation.84 References are constantly made to the volume and severity of the regulatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 The Industrial Relations Act 1947, Fifth Schedule.  
81 For example, in relation to termination of service see Johri, above n. 43, at paras. 197-198; in relation to 
unfair practices see Johri, above n. 43, paras 206-208; and in relation to lay-offs and retrenchments Johri, above 
n. 43, paras. 522-523. 
82 P. Sarkar, ‘Indian Labour Regulation and its Impact on Unemployment: A Leximetric Study, 1970–2006’ 
Unpublished Paper, Economics Department, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 2011. An electronic version is 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1913609. The dataset has been compiled by the Centre for Business 
Research at the University of Cambridge : see http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-
20output.htm. 
83 See generally, Ratnam, above n. 67. 
84 See generally, Sankaran, above n. 14, at pp. 241-244; Sundar, above n. 52, ch. 1; Amjad, above n. 14, at pp. 
170-173; R. Jenkins, ‘Labor Policy and the Second Generation of Economic Reform in India’ (2004) 3 India 
Review 333, at p. 333. 
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framework and the arcane nature of the rules and institutions constituting Indian labour law.85 
As noted earlier India has well in excess of 150 separate laws86 governing the labour market 
and the workforce, many of which overlap, deviate from Central principles or are perceived 
to be simply out of date.87 This perception of ‘over-regulation’88 has given rise to agitation 
from many sources89 for the various Indian governments to roll back their regulation of 
labour and workplaces, particularly those laws which impact upon the capacity of enterprises 
to hire and fire more easily, and to engage labour on more flexible arrangements,90 and those 
requiring the payment of minimum wages.91 At the same time, this pressure for reform has 
been strongly resisted by the labour movement generally.92 
In part this comes down to disagreement over evidence, and in part over ideology.93 Certainly 
there are legitimate doubts raised in the literature on the accuracy of the supposed connection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 For a general overview see A. Ahsan, C. Pages and T. Roy, ‘Legislation, Enforcement and Adjudication in 
Indian Labor Markets: Origins, Consequences and the Way Forward’ in D. Mazumdar and S. Sarkar (eds.), 
Globalization, Labour Markets and Inequality in India, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 
2008, at ch. 11. 
86 Estimates vary; compare Sundar above n. 52, at p. 5, D. S. Leelavathi, ‘The Contours of Labour Sector 
Reforms in India’ in G. Saibaba (ed.), Labour and Development in Twenty First Century, Serials Publications, 
New Delhi, 2005, at p. 378, and T. S. Papola and J. Pais, ‘Debate on Labour Market Reforms in India: A Case 
of Misplaced Focus’ (2007) 50 Indian Journal of Labour Economics 183 at p. 196; F. L. Cooke, ‘Employment 
Relations in China and India’ in M. Barry and A. Wilkinson (eds.), Research Handbook of Comparative 
Employment Relations, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham U.K. , 2011, at pp. 188-189. According to the Indian Labour 
Bureau, in 2003 there were 236 important labour related statutes in India, 76 at Central level, and 160 at State 
level: Labour Bureau, India Labour Year Book, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, 
New Delhi, 2004. As a result of this voluminous regulation a typical factory or business establishment might 
have to deal with about 25 or so pieces of central government legislation and perhaps a further 10-15 pieces of 
state legislation. 
87 See Sundar, above n. 52, at p. 5. 
88 See Ahsan, Pages and Roy, above n. 85, at p. 248, Papola and Pais, above n. 86, at p. 196. 
89 This includes both international and national bodies. The World Economic Forum has identified restrictive 
labour regulation as a major factor in limiting the ease of doing business in India, and India is ranked 116th of 
155 countries in the ‘ease of hiring and firing’ workers according to the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey of 
2006: see Sundar, above n. 52, at pp. 6-9. In the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey of 2005 India was also 
ranked poorly when compared with many other countries on other matters such as the restriction on increasing 
or reducing the number of working hours: V. N. Prasad, Labour Regulation in Small Enterprises: Coverage and 
Impact, Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi, 2008, pp. 4-5. Sankaran notes that the 
Second National Commission on Labour, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, 2002, also recommended 
changes to the laws on lay-offs and retrenchment: see Sankaran, above n. 14, at p. 242.  
90 Ahsan, Pages and Roy instance a series of provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act as being particularly 
noxious to employment creation. These are: s. 11-A which permits Labour Courts to modify retrenchment 
orders (including disciplinary dismissals); s. 25-O which makes it mandatory for employers to refer cases of 
business closure to state governments and s. 25-F and 25-G which, according to the authors, ‘practically 
disallow retrenchments or lay-offs without compensation except when the owner dies’. The authors also declare 
Chapter VB of the Act (see above n. 74 and associated text) to be ‘more restrictive than anywhere else in the 
world’: Ahsan, Pages and Roy, above n. 85, at pp. 264-273. 
91 For details on the kind of reforms under consideration over the past two decades see Leelavathi, above n. 86. 
See also the works cited in n. 77 above. 
92 See Sankaran, above n. 14, at p. 242;  Johri, above n. 43, paras. 64-66. 
93 See T. S. Papola and J. Pais, above n. 86, at p. 186; T. S. Papola, J. Pais and P. P. Sahu, Labour Regulation in 
Indian Industry: Towards a Rational and Equitable Framework, Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, 
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between Indian labour law and the perceived ‘inflexibility’ of the Indian labour market: at the 
very least the evidence is considered slight, ambiguous or both.94 However, this question is 
not a core concern for us here, although we do return to the issue in the next section of the 
paper. Rather, we are interested in whether, and if so to what extent, labour law in India has 
undergone a period of modification in response to liberalisation, and what form that change 
might have taken. 
The immediate catalyst for action in labour market reform in India is grounded in the state of 
economic crisis which confronted the country in the late 1980s. It is not necessary for us to 
detail these problems here, but it is important to note that the government was obliged to 
accept a readjustment package proposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund which required certain steps to be taken to liberalise the economy.95 As part of this 
‘New Industrial Policy’ the Indian government was committed to reducing the number of 
industry sectors under the monopoly or control of the state, abolishing the need for 
government approval for new investment in specific sectors of the economy, and generally 
winding back the public sector. Unprofitable state industries were to be wound back or closed 
down, and a more flexible system for the licensing of new businesses introduced.96 A shift to 
a less regulated labour market, particularly in relation to the tight controls exercised (at least 
in the organised sector) over dismissals and redundancies and the use of contract labour, was 
inevitably part of this policy.97 Workers were to be disciplined by the market rather than by 
state control.98 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
New Delhi, 2008, at p. 107. See also Sankaran, above n. 14, at pp. 242-244; Sundar , above n. 52, at pp. 8-10; 
and T. Deb, ‘Reforming Labour Legislation on Working Conditions for Competitive Advantage: An Empirical 
Study’ (2010) 46 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations 201. 
94 See Sankaran, above n. 14, at pp. 242-244; P. Fallon and R. Lucas, ‘Job Security Regulations and the 
Dynamic Demand for Labor in India and Zimbabwe’ (1993) 40 Journal of Development Economics 241; 
Jenkins, above n. 84; T. Besley and R. Burgess, ‘Can Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence 
from India’ (2004) 119 Quarterly Journal of Economics 91; S. D. Roy, ‘Employment Dynamics in Indian 
Industry: Adjustment Lags and the Impact of Job Security Regulations (2004) 73 Journal of Development 
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Issues and Perspectives’ in J. Felipe and R. Hasan (eds.), Labour Markets in India: Issues and Perspectives, 
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006; A. Bhattacharjea, ‘Labour Market Regulation and Industrial 
Performance in India: A Critical Review of the Empirical Evidence’ (2006) 49 Indian Journal of Labour 
Economics 211; Ahsan, Pages and Roy, above n. 85; Papola and Pais, above n. 86. 
95 See Candland, above n. 11, at pp. 99-100; Jenkins, above n. 84. 
96 For some general details on this policy, and its implications for industrial relations in India see J. S. Sodhi, 
‘New Economic Policies and Their Impact on Industrial Relations’ (1993) 29 Indian Journal of Industrial 
Relations 31. See also A. Kotwal, B. Ramaswami and W. Wadhwa, ‘Economic Liberalization and Indian 
Economic Growth: What’s the Evidence?’ (2011) 49 Journal of Economic Literature 1152. 
97 Jenkins, above n. 84; Papola and Pais, above n. 86. 
98 Sundar, above n. 15, at p. 931. 
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Generally, successive governments, through various policy pronouncements, have continued 
to espouse support for these policies, including those designed to effect adjustment in the 
labour market and employment relations.99 But the degree to which these policies have 
achieved real outcomes, and the manner of their doing so, have remained unclear and 
contentious. Consequent neo-liberal reform measures, according to one account, have 
included policies to ‘...weaken union power, outlaw strikes, individualize labour relations, 
privatize public enterprises, dilute labour laws, freedom to hire and fire and close 
undertakings [sic.], removal of prohibition of contract labour [sic.], freedom to introduce 
technical changes [sic.], repeal of legal provisions relating to bonus [sic.] and so on’.100 But 
nevertheless, there is considerable caution, if not to say scepticism, over how much progress 
has been made in following these policies through.101 
The main reason for caution seems to be linked with both the political and legal strategies 
being adopted in the slow liberalisation process. By and large the labour reform policies have 
been pursued not through major legislative change, but through a ‘less direct’ and more 
piecemeal approach.102 One critical explanation for this lies in the fact that various political 
and labour alliances across different political parties are usually sufficient to block major 
labour law reform.103 Put another way: ‘Labour law reforms have traditionally worked in 
India when approved through the tripartite route’.104 Traditionally the Indian union movement 
was very powerful in political terms by virtue of its incorporation into the party political 
process, and although this power had reached its high point by about the mid-1970s, and 
membership decline has since impacted upon its capacity to resist change,105 overall most 
authorities still rank the political influence of the union movement as critical.106 
This has led, then, to what has been described as a gradual approach to liberalisation.107 
Although there have been some labour policy initiatives at the Central government level,108 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 See Leelavathi, above n. 86. 
100 Sundar, above n. 15, at p. 930. 
101 See, for example, the observations by Ahsan, Pages and Roy, above n. 85, at pp. 247-250. 
102 See Jenkins, above n. 84; Sundar, above n. 15, at p. 932. Jenkins labels this ‘reform by stealth’. 
103 See Sundar, above n. 15, at p. 932; Jenkins, above n. 84, at pp. 344ff. 
104 Sankaran, above n. 14, at p. 245; C. K. Johri, ‘Industrial Relations as Regulated by Law: Suggestions for 
Change’ (1996) 31 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations 439; Anon. ‘Wartime Developments in Trade Union 
Organisation in India’ (1946) 53 International Labour Review 349. 
105 See Papola and Pais, above n. 86, at p. 193. 
106 See Jenkins, above n. 84; Sundar, above n. 15; Candland, above n. 11, at pp. 30-31. 
107 Sundar, above n. 15, at p. 932; Jenkins, above n. 84, at p. 340. 
108The Central government introduced the concept of Special Economic Zones as part of its Export-Import 
Policy 1997-2002. It was anticipated that this would lead to the provision of more flexible work laws to attract 
capital, but see n. 112 below and associated text. The Central government also appointed a Second National 
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including, for example, various proposals and Bills for the protection of workers in the 
unorganised sector,109 the most important and ongoing movements towards liberalisation in 
labour law have taken place at the State government level. Jenkins has pointed out that 
India’s Federal political structure has lent itself to a more gradual reform agenda in three 
specific ways. First competition between the various States for investment has led to legal 
change on a State by State basis hence avoiding the need for an all embracing national reform 
of labour law. In order to attract investment, often State governments provide assurances to 
investors that certain inconvenient labour standards will not be enforced. Secondly, dealing 
with the issues on a State by State basis also waters down the degree of political resistance 
from unions and other opposition forces. Third, State reforms may act as models for changes 
in other States, or even to provide some leadership for reform at the Central government 
level.110 
It is important, therefore, in understanding whatever limited progress has been achieved in 
the liberalisation of Indian labour law and regulation, to look closely at the developments in 
several of the important States. It is first necessary to note that even here many of the bolder 
proposals for reform have failed to pass into law. The State of Maharashtra is a good case in 
point, with major reform proposals being presented by the Director of Industries in 2000, and 
through an Industrial Policy Statement in 2001. Among these proposals were changes to 
minimum wage laws, retrenchment laws, laws relating to the inspection of work premises, 
and laws pertaining to the size of plants excluded from regulation. None of these changes 
were implemented due to opposition from trade union and political interests.111 Similarly, 
attempts by the Maharashtra State government (and other States) to introduce more flexible 
‘hire and fire’ laws into the businesses situated in the state’s Special Economic Zones has 
generally been met with a negative response from the Central authorities (although it is 
necessary to note that in practice labour laws are rarely enforced in these zones, and thus 
rarely, if ever, restrict market operations despite the limitations inherent in the formal law).112 
On the other hand there are also examples of successful modifications being made to central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Commission on Labour in 1999 with a view to rationalising India’s labour laws. The Commission’s Report was 
released in 2002. This went so far as to propose a new model of labour law for the country, and also proposed 
comprehensive legislation to ensure a minimum level of protection to workers engaged in the unorganised 
sectors of the economy (see R. Datt, ‘National Commission on Labour and Review of Labour Laws’ (2003) 46 
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109 Prasad, above n. 89, pp. 49-50. 
110 See Jenkins, above n. 84, at pp. 341-343. 
111 See Sundar, above n. 52, at pp. 148-152. 
112 Sundar, above n. 52, at p. 154. 
22	  
	  
labour laws by some provincial governments, the State of Andhra Pradesh being a case in 
point.113 
In general terms the liberalisation process in the labour laws of the Indian States has included 
the relaxation of laws against the employment of women at night, greater ease in shift 
working, and greater freedom for the use of contract labour.114 According to one source, the 
use of contract labour, and the sub-contracting of non-core activities to other firms, increased 
substantially during the 1990s, though this increase was more pronounced in some States than 
others.115 On the other hand, despite the general laxity of enforcement in labour law, the laws 
on retrenchment continue to be comparatively strictly implemented.116 
Other minor changes include matters such as the minimisation of workplace inspections and 
technical changes to the administration of workplaces and keeping of records required under 
various pieces of factory legislation and so on.117 Much of this change has been facilitated 
through administrative procedure rather than formal legal repeal and enactment.118 According 
to one recent study, while India’s job security laws have remained fairly stable for regular 
contracts (i.e. ongoing contracts in the organised or formal sector) the system is now more 
flexible in relation to temporary and fixed-term contracts. This reflects the fact that ‘the main 
area of labour law reform that has come about in recent years, allowing employees to work 
on temporary work agency contracts to carry out a range of “non-core” activities, a concept 
that is defined in various ways across states ... Standard fixed-term contracts are allowed for 
white-collar workers as well as, in principle, for regular workers’.119 
However, despite these shifts in labour law at the State level, it remains the case that the 
liberalisation process has produced modest outcomes at best. An OECD study reported by 
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Dougherty examined eight sets of regulatory variables (totalling fifty separate subject areas) 
for potential reform lightening the regulatory burden upon businesses across 21 Indian States. 
In keeping with our earlier observations, the largest number of reforms related to contract 
labour, but even so, there had only been reform in about half of the subject areas pertaining to 
this form of employment. No State had a score of much more than 50 per cent in terms of 
change in possible reform areas, and in seven of the 50 subject areas no more than two States 
had made any reforms at all. Areas of regulation showing little change across the 21 States 
included collective lay-offs, the regulation of working hours, union recognition and 
reductions in the numbers of inspections.120 
3. Quality,	  Purpose	  and	  Impact	  in	  Indian	  Labour	  Law	  
	  
There are always difficulties, we suggest, in interpreting the purpose and role of labour law 
systems in any given society. Labour law, more than many other areas of regulatory policy, 
may have more immediate and fundamental implications for social and economic stability 
and progress, and legal formality may not always fully express or capture the kinds of 
compromises which inevitably exist in relations between capital and labour, and in the 
regulation of labour markets. 
In our necessarily brief overview of the evolution of labour law in India, we have pointed to 
various anomalies and problems which require further elaboration and discussion. First, 
though, it is necessary for us to clarify one or two matters going to the legal foundations of 
the Indian labour law system. As we have noted there is a continued relevance of some non-
legal socio-cultural relations in the organisation and practices of Indian labour markets to the 
present day.121 However, formal labour law in India is firmly based on Western values and 
concepts, much of it derived from International Labour Organisation standards. It has evolved 
from early penal provisions on labour, through to the extension of protective labour 
conditions of work, and the rights of labour to security in a broader social sense. Moreover, 
Indian labour law has recognised and legitimated trade unions and their activities and 
established procedures for the settlement of industrial disputes. While there may be problems 
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in accurately categorising India according to the indicators used in the ‘legal origins’ labour 
law discourse, Indian labour law is Western in conception and (at least nominal) operation.122 
This suggests, then, that we are able to evaluate the role and impact of Indian labour law 
accordingly. It is necessary, of course, to recognise that social, economic, political and 
cultural contexts will inevitably have a heavy bearing upon how labour laws are received, 
adapted and given effect in particular socio-economic contexts,123 but it is also important to 
recognise that such laws are introduced usually not to replicate or reproduce existing social 
and economic relations, but at least in part to replace or alter them. 
In the Indian case we must suppose that its labour law values, as articulated in its 
Constitution and its originating economic policies in the post-independence period, were 
constructed and evolved in the supposition that the country’s socio-economic path would 
follow a similar trajectory to the process of industrialisation, urbanisation and formalisation 
that occurred in the developed economies of Western countries. 
**** 
One of the most prominent aspects of the debate over the development of Indian labour law is 
the widely varying viewpoints taken of its qualities and effects. Much of this concerns what 
DeSousa has labelled the apparent ‘disjunctures’ between the stated objectives of labour law 
regulation and the ‘actual practices’ of industrial relations,124 but there are other discordant 
perspectives in evidence.  
For example, Indian labour law has been labelled ‘progressive’,125 and identified as one of the 
country’s most important institutions.126 Yet, on the other hand, more recently Indian labour 
law has been described as mired in old-fashioned, out-of-touch regulation,127 as ‘bizarre’,128 
and the industrial relations system that it regulates as ‘absurd’.129 Indeed the complaints about 
the quality and effects of Indian labour law are extensive to say the least. There are said to be 
too many laws. The law is said to lack uniformity, to be overly detailed, to be inconsistent, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 See below nn 171-177.  
123 S. Cooney, T. Lindsey, R. Mitchell and Y. Zhu (eds.), Law and Labour Market Regulation in East Asia, 
Routledge, London, 2002;  P. Nicholson and S. Biddulph (eds.), Examining Practice, Interrogating Theory: 
Comparative Legal Studies in Asia, Brill, Leiden, 2008. 
124 See DeSousa, above n. 6.  
125 See Menon, above n. 12, at pp. 570-571. 
126 See Vaid, above n. 7.  
127 See Sundar, above n. 52, at p. 6; Sankaran, above n. 14.  
128 See C. Navin, ‘Legal Regulations of Labour Market’ (1999) 42 Indian Journal of Labour Economics 855. 
129 See Hill, above n.15.  
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ambiguous, and poorly co-ordinated in policy terms. The whole system is said to be over-
regulated, and at the same time to be largely ineffective.130 Attempts to integrate and 
consolidate Indian labour law into a single Labour Code, such as that initiated by the National 
Labour Law Association in 1994, have been unsuccessful. 
As we noted at the outset of this paper, all of this suggests the need for a much more detailed 
survey of the role of the state, and its legal policies, over the course of Indian industrialisation 
in the post -independence period.  But for the more limited purposes of this present project 
we aim to deal with two key questions concerning the purposes of state policy in Indian 
labour law and the impact of those policies. A broader and lengthier analysis will have to 
await further work. 
As we have noted, the most common and influential view taken of the state’s role in the 
Indian political economy is one which emphasises the dominance of the state’s interests in 
shaping the Indian economy and the co-ordination of labour and capital to that end.131 These 
arrangements have been described in terms of ‘state socialism’ and ‘corporatism’,132 and the 
analyses point to the strong state involvement in economic planning and development, a 
dominant role for the public sector, and strong regulation of the private sector. Under this 
model, unions, labour and capital were drawn, or compelled, into ostensibly collaborative 
arrangements,133 rather than the conflict-based models that were embodied in the collective 
bargaining and arbitration systems of Western economies. 
It is against this background that we can give some consideration to the specific objectives of 
the state in Indian labour law. In moulding the differing concerns of capital and labour to the 
interests of the Indian state, to what particular ends did the various Indian governments shape 
its labour laws and institutions? And how effective were they in that task? 
The international literature concerned with the purposes of labour law suggests that there are 
numerous possible objectives underlying labour law systems, and that these may ebb and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 See Sundar, above n. 52, at p. 5; Papola and Pais, above n. 86; Ornati, above n. 9, pp. 82-83, 92-93; A. N. 
Sharma, ‘Flexibility, Employment and Labour Market Reforms in India’ (2006) 41 Economic and Political 
Weekly 2078; Bhattacherjee and Ackers, above n. 8, at p. 112; Sankaran, above n. 14, at p. 236; Ahsan, Pages 
and Roy, above n. 85.  
131 Candland, above n.11, at p.16. 
132 Sankaran, above n.14, at p. 227; Sundar, above n.15. Note that Sundar identifies different stages/varieties of 
corporatism in Indian industrial relations although the core principles remained the same throughout. 
133 This type of approach had already emerged during the war years if not earlier: see Anon, above n. 104.  
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flow, and perhaps even change radically, in response to changing socio-economic contexts.134 
It is not necessary for us to cover all of this ground here. We suggest that historically two 
core purposes have characterised the role of labour law in a very general sense. The first of 
these has been to protect the interests of workers in what is seen to be an unequal power 
relationship between labour and capital. The second has been to support, in various ways, the 
system of production and distribution, and hence economic development and social 
prosperity. As we have noted in Section 2 of this paper, the Indian state had already by the 
late 1940s and early-1950s constructed a substantial body of protective legislation, and the 
volume of regulation of this type continued to grow into the 1980s, particularly in relation to 
occupational health and safety, equal opportunity, employment security, social insurance and 
other minimum standards. Alongside this regulation was a legislative system designed to 
settle industrial disputes and limit the economic damage of strikes and other forms of 
industrial action. In the Indian context these two strands of legislation have been described in 
the following terms: 
 Broadly the object of labour law is two-fold; (i) to improve the service 
 conditions of industrial labour so as to provide for them the ordinary 
 amenities of life, and (ii) by that process, to bring about industrial peace 
 which would in turn, accelerate productivity in the country resulting in its 
 prosperity which in turn, helps to impose the conditions of labour so that 
 same [sic.] can be raised from the stage of minimum wage and passing 
 through need-found [sic.] wage and fair wage reach the level of living 
 wage [sic.].135 
The second question, with which this section of the paper is largely concerned, follows 
immediately from the first. If we are correct in taking these to be the two main goals of 
Indian labour law throughout its lengthy evolution, how effective has the law been in 
reaching those objectives? The question of impact (or effectiveness) is often an ignored issue 
in legal studies generally. While an examination of the formal institutions of labour law 
inevitably tells us something about the law’s historical antecedents, its supposed purposes, 
the style of its regulation and the means of its enforcement, it cannot of itself contribute to a 
measure of how, and to what extent the rules apply, nor what effect it has on the behaviour 
and experience of the parties engaged in industrial relations and labour market arrangements.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 See, for example, G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds.), The Idea of Labour Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011. 
135 See Mishra, above n. 7, at p.10. 
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There is extensive debate in the Indian economics and industrial relations literature about 
these matters generally, and here we draw upon this material as a means of making an 
assessment of the effectiveness of labour law across the two main goals identified above. 
Before turning to each of these specific matters in turn, however, it may be useful to make 
some observations about the effectiveness of Indian labour law in general. 
It will have been evident from our foregoing discussion that notwithstanding the emergence 
of India as a modernising, industrialising state with impressive levels of economic growth, its 
labour law system is widely regarded as largely, if not wholly, ineffective. There are several 
grounds upon which such observations are based. First, India is still a very hierarchical 
society, and access to jobs is still heavily influenced by matters such as caste, sect and 
religion. This affects both the procurement of positions in the formal sector, and wage 
differentials in the regulated labour market in particular.136 
Second, as we have also noted throughout, Indian labour law is limited in application by size 
of establishment, type of economic activity, type of employment relationship, type of 
employment position and so on. The immediate consequence of this is that the law has very 
limited application, and the great bulk of workers engaged in the informal sector are simply 
not regulated by any labour law at all.137 
Thirdly, even where labour laws do apply in principle, the law is easy enough to evade in 
practice,138 and generally enforcement is very poor. According to many authorities there is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See, for example, M. B. Das and P. V. Dutta, ‘Does Caste Matter for Wages in the Indian Labour Market?’ 
World Bank, 2007; Harriss-White and Gooptu, above n. 16; B. Banerjee and J. B Knight, ‘Caste Discrimination 
in the Indian Urban Labour Market’  (1985) 17 Journal of Development Economics 277; A. P. D’Costa, 
‘Geography, Uneven Development and Distributive Justice: The Political Economy of IT Growth in India’ 
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the Industrial Workforce in India’ (1960) 104 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 124.  
137 ‘Take the labour laws...Their loopholes are big enough for the proverbial bus to be driven through...’: See 
Harriss-White and Gooptu, above n.16, at p. 103. 
138 For examples, see M. Singh, ‘Unorganised Industries: Conditions of Work and Labour Laws’ (1988) 23 
Indian Journal of Industrial Relations 373; T. Warnecke and A. de Ruyter, ‘A Race to the Bottom? Variations 
Between States and Provinces in the Enforcement of Decent Work: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and 
India’, paper presented at Conference on Regulating for a Fair Recovery Network, International Labour Office, 
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corruption and collusion between inspection agents and employers,139 there is an overall 
decline in the rate of inspections and prosecutions for breaches of the laws,140 and there are 
deficiencies in the qualities of inspectors.141 Against this, the overall weakness of the trade 
union movement, and the poor education of workers142 means that labour is unable to 
influence these outcomes to any marked degree. 
It follows from these observations that far from regarding Indian labour law as one of the 
country’s key institutions, as some have suggested,143 a more realistic appraisal would 
suggest that Indian labour law is, perhaps with some exceptions relating to specific types of 
protections,144 and in some particular regions where provincial governments have made the 
regulation of the informal sector and enforcement a special focus,145 not very important at all 
beyond a very small sector of the workforce. Clearly this has significant implications for the 
idea of labour law, and its effects in socio-economic terms, and we explore some of these 
issues in the following discussion. 
The	  Protection	  of	  Labour	  
 
Both the support ostensibly offered by the Indian state towards labour, and the supposed 
long-run power and influence of the Indian union movement at large (at least until the mid-
1970s),146 would tend to suggest that the Indian labour law framework has provided strong 
protection for labour vis-a-vis business interests, but in point of fact this issue has been 
strongly debated for decades, as we noted earlier. Beginning at least with the trade union and 
industrial disputes laws of the 1920s, through to the wartime legislation of the 1940s and 
beyond, trade union representatives and labour scholars have tended to characterise much of 
the Indian labour law framework, and the way that it operates, as highly restrictive, and at 
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India’s Factories Act and the United States’ Hazard Communication Standard’ (1996) 17 Comparative Labor 
Law Journal 565, at p. 587.  
142 Kauff, above n. 141, at pp. 573-575 and p. 587.  
143 See Vaid, above n. 7.  
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times even repressive,147 of labour and its representative institutions. Yet, on the other hand, 
there is a plethora of legislation designed to construct a floor of minimum rights underneath 
the employment relationship across Indian industries and occupations widely. The question is 
what are we to make of these two apparently mismatched perceptions? It is useful at this 
point to set out some of this legislative framework in brief detail.  
Papola, Pais and Sahu have characterised the minimum rights legislation in India as ‘welfare 
state’ inspired; that is to say, that it is designed to protect labour as the weaker party in 
industrial relations.148 The authors group the relevant legislation into four areas - Conditions 
of Work, Wages and Remuneration, Employment Security, and Social Security.149 
Among the first set of legislation are included the important provisions of the Factories Act 
1948,150 the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970,151 and the various Shops 
and Commercial Establishments Acts.152 The core purpose of the Factories Act is to ensure 
the health and safety of workers. It contains specific requirements for factories to be kept 
clean and sanitary, it regulates hours of work, overtime and annual leave, and provides for 
mandatory rest days. The Act also makes special provision for women and children regarding 
their working conditions. One of the key characteristics of Indian labour law is the density of 
its regulation, and this is exemplified in the terms of the Factories Act. For example the Act 
specifically prescribes the minimum workspace for each worker, and specifically mandates 
the manner of cleaning, repainting and so on of regulated premises.153 The Act applies to all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Particularly during periods of political instability and international conflict: Sundar, above n. 15.  
148 Papola, Pais and Sahu, above n. 93, at p. 15. 
149 This is a slightly amended version of the organisation of legislation presented in the work of Papola, Pais and 
Sahu, above n. 93. Otherwise, in terms of content our account of the legislation is largely drawn from that of the 
authors. 
150 Act 63 of 1948 (as amended). 
151 Act 37 of 1970 (as amended by Act 14 of 1986 and Act 4 of 2005). 
152 In addition to these Acts, several others are described by the authors. These include the Interstate Migrant 
Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service)Act 1979 (to safeguard the terms and 
conditions of work of workers engaged by contractors to work in another State; applies across India generally to 
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153 See Papola, Pais and Sahu, above n. 93, at p. 23. 
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manufacturing premises that use electricity and employ 10 or more workers, and to non-
powered premises that employ 20 or more.154 
The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, as its title suggests, is designed both to 
prohibit the use of contract labour in certain industries, and to regulate its use in others. 
Under the terms of the Act the ‘appropriate government’ (Central or State), pursuant to a 
prescribed procedure set down in the legislation, may prohibit the employment of contract 
labour in an industry. In the case of the Central government, the employment of such labour 
has been prohibited in certain categories of work in mines, on railways and port facilities 
among others.155 The Act otherwise regulates the conditions of work, including payment of 
wages, hours of work, overtime, leave and so on, in addition to providing various health and 
safety measures. The Act applies generally across the whole of India, but is limited by size to 
establishments or contractors employing at least 20 contractors on any day over the previous 
12 months. The provisions may also be extended to smaller establishments pursuant to a 
procedure set down in the legislation. 
The Shops and Commercial Establishments Acts are a series of State level enactments 
designed to supplement the Central government’s Factories Act through regulation of shops, 
restaurants, hotels, places of entertainment such as cinemas, and also small electrical and 
mechanical repair shops and small manufacturing businesses. Specifically the legislation does 
not apply to government offices, public utilities such as power and water, and medical 
centres. The Acts regulate for hours of work, wage rates, overtime, paid holidays, rest days, 
annual leave, and termination notice, in addition to some health and safety-type provisions. 
All major States have passed versions of this law,156 with sufficient variation between them to 
enable a ranking of their protective qualities.157 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 State governments are permitted to extend the application of this Act to workplaces with a lower threshold 
number of workers, except in the case of family-based businesses. Whilst some State governments have, from 
time to time, exercised this power, in general this has not been so as to significantly widen the Act’s coverage: 
see S. Sundar, Current State of Industrial Relations in Tamil Nadu, International Labour Organisation, 2010, at 
pp. 15, 26. 
155 See Papola, Pais and Sahu, above n. 93, at p. 25. There is some modification to the legislation at State level 
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156 Andaman and Nicobar Islands Shops and Establishments Regulation 2005, Andhra Pradesh Shops and 
Establishments Act 1988, Assam Shops and Establishments Act 1971, Bihar Shops and Establishment Act 1953, 
Bombay Shops and Establishments Act 1948 (applies in Gujarat and Maharashtra), Chattisargh Shops and 
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1956, Jharkhand Shops and Establishments Act 1953, Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act 
1961, Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act 1960, Madhya Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act 
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Two further important pieces of legislation which should be briefly noted here are the Child 
Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986, which abolishes child labour in particular 
operations and strictly regulates the working conditions where child labour is permitted, and 
the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 which attempts both to eliminate and 
rehabilitate bonded labour through strong enforcement mechanisms. 
Turning to the matter of ‘Wages and Remuneration’, four pieces of legislation should be 
noted. The Minimum Wages Act 1948158 is a core statute, requiring the appropriate 
government, whether Central or State, to set minimum wages for certain types of 
employment or industries as specified in the Schedule to the Act. The legislation applies very 
widely in terms of numbers of workers covered as there is no minimum limit on the number 
of employees to be employed for the Act to take effect.  However, as is the case with other 
relevant labour standards, the legislation is limited by reference to those types of employment 
stipulated in the legislation and the Act’s schedule. The schedule lists sectors ranging from 
carpet making and shawl weaving to various types of mines, plantations, flour mills, tanneries 
and public motor transport. Coverage is further complicated by many State amendments 
which both add to and delete from the industries and occupations dealt with.159 Rates of pay 
vary not only from industry to industry, but from State to State, and from region to region. 
Rural areas generally have lower minimum rates of pay than urban areas. In keeping with the 
character of Indian labour regulation generally, the determination of minimum rates under the 
legislation is quite detailed and complex. The minimum standard is set in two parts, a basic 
rate, plus special allowances to cater for differences in the cost of living. 
A second important regulation is the pre-independence Payment of Wages Act 1936.160 This 
Act was designed to deal primarily with a problem common to Indian industrial relations at 
the time of its enactment, namely the unauthorised deductions by employers from workers’ 
wages in the form of penalties and fines. Originally the Act was confined to larger 
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157 See Dougherty, above n. 119.   
158 Act 11 of 1948 (as amended). 
159 For a complete list of the relevant State amendments see S. Malik and the SCC Editorial Office, P. L. Malik’s 
Industrial Law, Vol II, pp. 2642-2669. 
160 Act 4 of 1936 (as amended). 
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establishments in the factories sector and in railways, and, again, only within a certain wage 
ceiling. However, over time the operation of the Act has been broadened to include other 
sectors,161 although the wage ceiling remains.162  
Two further wage-related provisions of importance are the Payment of Bonus Act 1965,163 
which provides for the payment of an annual bonus (the amount of which is prescribed in the 
legislation) to all employees receiving wages below a specified limit. This legislation applies 
to virtually all States, but is limited to particular establishments employing at least 20 
persons. The Equal Remuneration Act 1976164 prescribes equal remuneration for males and 
females performing the same work (and other forms of equal treatment), but, again, is limited 
in application - in this case to establishments which employ 10 or more workers. 
The three main sets of regulations providing for various forms of security and welfare 
benefits are the Employees’ State Insurance Act 1948,165 the Employees’ Provident Funds 
and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952,166 and the Employees' Compensation Act 1923.167 
The first of these introduced the Employees’ State Insurance Scheme which provides 
insurance cover for employees in the case of sickness, workplace injury and disablement, and 
maternity, in addition to death benefits for dependants. The scheme is financed through 
employer and employee contributions, with medical facilities provided by State governments. 
Virtually all States are covered by the scheme, but it is limited in application to factories and 
other establishments (excluding seasonal occupations) employing not less than 20 workers.  
The second legislative provision has given rise to three major schemes designed to provide 
for workers on their retirement or their dependants in cases of early death and so on. Initially 
the Act set up the Employees’ Provident Fund to which it is compulsory for employers and 
employees to contribute. The scheme is widespread across most States, but is limited by 
industrial sector and by establishment size (those employing 20 workers or more). It does not 
apply to government employees, or to workers earning more than a specified amount. Other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 In the State of Maharashtra, for example, the Act has been extended to all establishments covered under that 
State’s Shops and Commercial Establishments Act: Papola, Pais and Sahu, above n. 93, at p. 31.  
162 Presently those workers receiving a wage of more than Rs. 10,000 per month are unable to make use of this 
legislation to redress wage payment issues arising from their employment.  
163 Act 21 of 1965 (as amended). In form the payment is constituted by what amounts to a ‘deferred wage’ as 
well as a form of profit sharing. For discussion on origins and early operation of this Act see: K. Mathur, ‘Bonus 
Legislation in India’ (1966) 1 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations 457. 
164 Act 25 of 1976 (as amended). 
165 Act 3 of 1948 (as amended). 
166 Act 19 of 1952 (as amended). 
167 Act 8 of 1923 (as amended). This legislation was formerly the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1923: see above 
n. 25. 
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schemes subsequently introduced under this legislation include the Deposit-Linked Insurance 
Scheme of 1976, and the Employees' Pension Scheme of 1995.168 
As we noted in Section 2 of this paper, the Employees' Compensation Act 1923, was one of 
the earliest pieces of labour reform legislation introduced into India in the post-World War 
One period under the influence of the newly formed International Labour Organisation and 
was designed with an objective of improving safety standards in industry generally. Under 
this legislation employers are liable to pay compensation for death or personal injury suffered 
by employees as a result of a workplace accident or disease arising from employment, unless 
the accident is directly attributable to the employee’s use of alcohol or drugs, disobedience or 
wilful disregard of safety devices. This legislation applies quite widely both to regular 
workers, and to those otherwise engaged as part-time, temporary or casual workers, or as 
contract labour. However, as we have noted, in the unorganised sectors of the economy, and 
in many cases even in the organised sectors, implementation of this legislation is poor.169 
Two other pieces of legislation should also be noted. The Maternity Benefit Act 1961 
provides both pre-natal and post-natal leave entitlements and wage allowances for female 
employees. The scheme applies to all establishments covered under the Factories Act, the 
Mines Act, the Plantations Act, and to some other industries, in addition to all workers 
covered by the Shops and Commercial Establishments Acts. However it excludes those 
establishments already covered under the Employees’ State Insurance Scheme. The Payment 
of Gratuity Act 1972 provides for additional payment in the form of a gratuity to employees 
who have reached the point of taking their superannuation, retirement, resignation or death. 
The entitlements are limited to employees with continuous service of at least five years, and 
to establishments employing at least 10 workers. 
This brings us finally to the issue of employment security, which, as we noted earlier, is an 
area of particular controversy in Indian labour market regulation. In this general area the 
provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946, and chapters VA and 
VB of the Industrial Disputes Act in particular, Indian labour law has added a very strong 
component of protection against and compensation for various forms of dismissal, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 For details see D. Saini, Social Security Law in India, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2011. 
169 See above n. 49 and below n. 186.  
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retrenchment, and lay-offs, both individual and collective, although these laws are confined 
to certain types of workers and to certain types of establishments.170 
Taken at face value this extensive array of labour law suggests a system which is highly 
protective of labour’s interests. It provides a large number of workplace protections, much of 
which is formally in line with international standards. But at the same time, as we noted 
above, there has been a longstanding negative response from labour and independent 
observers about the real value of the labour law system to workers. Making sense of these 
apparent incongruities self-evidently requires closer analysis. 
One avenue of investigation is provided by the data used by scholars exploring the possible 
link between a country’s ‘legal origin’ and the protective strength of its labour laws.171 In this 
research labour law systems are scored across five sets of variables; the regulation of 
alternative employment contracts; the regulation of working time; the regulation of dismissal; 
the regulation of employee representation (including trade union recognition and collective 
bargaining); and the regulation of industrial action. 
Of the five countries examined in the work of Deakin, Lele and Siems, India appears as the 
third most ‘protective’ of the labour law systems included172 – ranked above the USA and the 
UK, slightly below the German system and well below the French – and this position largely 
held true throughout the entire period surveyed (1970–2005). Additional work by a different 
group of authors using the same coding system and adding two further countries, Australia 
and New Zealand, to the analysis, shows that India also ranks above those two countries in 
terms of their protective strengths in labour law, and again that position largely held true 
throughout the entire period surveyed with the exception of New Zealand from about 1974 
until the early 1990s.173 Thus of all five common law origin countries represented in the 
sample, Indian labour law appears most protective, and, importantly, ranks very close to 
Germany which is generally considered to be among the most labour-friendly of capitalist 
states. These results would lend some credibility to an argument which proposed that the type 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 See Papola, Pais and Sahu, above n. 93, at pp. 38-42. 
171 S. Deakin, P. Lele and M. Siems, ‘The Evolution of Labour Law: Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory 
Regimes’ (2007) 146 Internatioanal Labour Review 133; R. Mitchell, P. Gahan, A. Stewart, S. Cooney and S. 
Marshall, ‘The Evolution of Labour Law in Australia: Measuring the Change’ (2010) 23 Australian Journal of 
Labour Law 61; G. Anderson, P. Gahan, R. Mitchell and A. Stewart, ‘The Evolution of Labor Law in New 
Zealand: A Comparative Study of New Zealand, Australia and Five Other Countries’ (2011) 33 Comparative 
Labor Law and Policy Journal 137.  
172 This is only a small sample of countries: the UK, the USA, France, Germany and India. 
173 Mitchell et al, above n. 171; Anderson et al, above n. 171.  
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of state socialist policies adopted by the Indian government from the late-1940s onwards, and 
its ‘corporatist’ style of economic and labour market regulation was strongly labour-
protective. There are, however, several reasons for suggesting that such an assessment, if not 
entirely incorrect, nevertheless requires a more nuanced interpretation. 
First of all, when Indian labour law is looked at comparatively using the same data but at a 
sub-aggregate level, a very different picture emerges. What we find is that in relation to the 
forms of contractual arrangements that can be made, and in relation to dismissal in particular, 
Indian law is very labour protective, ranking above all six other countries surveyed on 
dismissal, and above all four other common law origin countries surveyed in relation to 
alternative employment contracts. Viewed largely on the basis of the state of the legal 
provisions, and in respect of these particular dimensions of labour law, this data does suggest, 
then, that Indian labour law deserves to be categorised, at least among common law 
countries, but possibly wider, as highly labour-protective. 
The position is, however, quite different once attention is switched to collective labour rights. 
Particularly in relation to employee representation through trade union recognition, and 
support for collective bargaining, India now appears at a relatively low level of protection 
grouped among the common law countries and a long way from the more labour-oriented 
systems of France and Germany,174 although India’s relative position vis-a-vis some of the 
other common law countries has been more volatile throughout the survey period, and 
certainly has been comparatively strong in relation to the right to take industrial action.175 
It is possible, of course, that trade unions have been able to exercise influence in the Indian 
political economy through political and industrial clout, and as we have noted, this has 
sometimes been a theme in the Indian literature. But the data referred to in the foregoing 
discussion suggests that if labour has been highly protected vis-a-vis the interests of business 
it has been through the individual floor of rights constructed by government through 
legislation rather than through collective rights exercised through trade unions and 
bargaining, and in this respect the data accords with the views of many authorities.176  
Other recent ‘leximetric’ studies of Indian labour law have confirmed this position. In a 
recent study of the impact of Indian labour law on unemployment, Sarkar has reported that of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Deakin, Lele and Siems, above n. 171, at p. 149 
175 Deakin, Lele and Siems, above n. 171; Anderson et al., above n. 171.  
176 See the earlier discussion in Section 2 of this paper. 
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40 variables used in the Deakin, Lele and Siems study, only nine underwent important 
variation in the period 1970–2006. Of these nine, eight were associated with improvements in 
the strength of the law protecting workers in cases of agency labour, individual and collective 
dismissals, and reinstatement. In other words most labour law change was in the area of 
individual rights and dismissals. Similarly Dougherty’s work using OECD Employment 
Outlook data records that in respect of both ‘regular contracts’ and ‘collective dismissals’ 
India’s Federal-level labour laws were stricter (more onerous on employers) than virtually all 
OECD countries (as at 2007).177 
All of this evidence suggests that historically the strategy of the Indian state has been to 
construct a strong floor of wide-ranging rights for individual workers in their dealings with 
employers. There remain, however, further matters in debate which continue to call into 
question both the bona fides and the efficacy of such an approach. 
One of the difficulties with the coding method generally employed in the ‘leximetric’ 
approach is that it is often difficult to assess the actual impact of the laws studied: generally 
the law is scored mainly on the basis of its formal qualities, and this was the case with the 
Deakin, Lele and Siems data for India upon which we have relied in this discussion.178 But it 
is well known that such an approach may produce highly misleading outcomes, and it is 
important therefore to consider other factors which can be expected to affect the integrity of 
Indian labour law. 
One of these factors concerns the very limited application of the various labour laws of India 
across the Indian economy generally.179 As we have noted in discussion throughout, even 
much earlier protective provisions applied only in a small proportion of establishments180 and 
this pattern has continued through into most of the modern labour laws. The all important 
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 applied (and still applies) only to ‘workmen’ employed in 
‘industries’, and whereas ‘industry’ has been interpreted reasonably broadly by the Supreme 
Court, the definition still excludes government employees, agricultural workers and domestic 
servants.181 More than 50 per cent of the Indian workforce was still engaged in the 
agricultural sector through the 1990s and beyond.182 Likewise, the Industrial Employment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Dougherty, above n.119.   
178 Deakin, Lele and Siems, above n. 171, at p.150. 
179 Sankaran, above n.14, at pp. 229-235; Damodaran, above n. 136; Bhattacherjee and Ackers, above n. 8.  
180 For example, the Factories Act 1881 applied only to establishments employing at least 100 workers. 
181 Sankaran, above n. 14, at p. 229; see also Gopalakrishnan and Tortell, above n. 49, pp. 532-533. 
182 Government of India, Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, 2009. 
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(Standing Orders) Act 1946 applies only to establishments of 100 or more employees, though 
in some states these provisions have been extended to enterprises employing 50 or more. 
Many other laws, as we have noted, are limited in application according to size, sector or 
other criteria. Most industrial workplaces in India simply fall below the threshold 
employment limit.183   
Further compromising factors include the structure of the Indian economy generally. The vast 
majority of Indians are employed on the unorganised (informal) sectors of the economy,184 in 
forms of self-employment, and in casual wage work. As noted above, much of this 
employment is still rurally based, but in urban areas it includes household workers and 
servants, and other menial services.185 Since the 1990s there has been a shift in employment 
away from the organised sectors of the economy to the informal sectors.186 There are only 27 
million workers employed in the organised private sector of the economy.187 Between 1991 
and 2006, there were 870,000 jobs shed from the public sector.188 At the same time there has 
been an increase in the numbers of persons employed as ‘contractors’ or ‘casuals’, or where 
the precise relationship between the worker and the employer is legally uncertain, within the 
formal sector. Each of these developments inevitably reduces the proportion of the workforce 
covered by India’s labour laws.189 Furthermore many workers engaged within the formal 
sector may still fall beyond the law’s protection. According to Sankaran, in 2005 the total 
workforce of India was 457 million persons, almost 395 million of whom were engaged in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Sankaran, above n. 14, at p. 229. To all intents and purposes this means that the small and medium-sized 
sectors of the economy fall outside the coverage of India’s labour laws: Prasad, above n. 89, generally.  
184 As noted earlier (see n. 50) the exact constitution of the ‘unorganised’ or ‘informal’ sector is unclear. The 
definition provided in Prasad, above n. 89, at p. 18, and drawn from the National Accounts Statistics is that it 
refers to ‘all operating units whose activities are not regulated under any statutory Act or legal provision and/or 
those which do not maintain any regular accounts’. An alternative definition, drawn from the National 
Commission on Labour  (1969), is provided by Singh in the following terms ‘‘The unorganised labour ...would 
be described as those (workers) who have not been able to organise in pursuit of a common objective because of 
constraints such as: (a) Casual nature of employment, (b) ignorance and illiteracy, (c) small size of 
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Labour Laws’ (1988) 23 Indian Journal of Industrial Relations 373 at p. 373. See also Ratnam, above n. 66, at 
p. 257. 
185 D’Costa, ‘Contemporary Capitalism’, above n. 136. See also T. S. Papola, ‘Globalisation, Employment and 
Social Protection: Emerging Perspectives for the Indian Workers’ (2004) 47 Indian Journal of Labour 
Economics 541. 
186 Formal sector employment as a percentage of total employment declined from 7.9% to 5.8% between 1983 
and 2005: D’Costa, ‘Contemporary Capitalism’, above n. 136.  
187 D’Costa, ‘Contemporary Capitalism’, above n. 136, at p. 25. 
188 Government of India, Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, 2006, 2009. 
189 A provision supporting the extension of social welfare and security schemes to workers in the  unorganised 
sector (The Unorganised Workers’ Social Security Act 2008), and other provisions supporting rural employment 
and job creation have emerged steadily over the past few years, though with mixed effects: see Hill, above n. 15, 
at pp. 406-407. 
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the informal sector. Of those in the formal sector only about 53% were actually covered by 
the labour laws, the remaining 47% constituting what amounts to ‘informal’ employment in 
the otherwise ‘formal’ sector. Various figures are advanced, but it is estimated that well over 
90% of the employed workforce falls outside the law’s protection.190  
One further issue concerns the question of enforcement and avoidance. We have noted in 
earlier discussion that even where the law applies in principle, that is to say in formal terms, 
it is quite easily ignored or avoided, and thereby its effects are rendered nugatory. There are 
many different ways in which employers can and do avoid labour regulation, even in the 
organised sector.191 For example firms may avoid retrenchment laws, and health and safety 
provisions, simply by splitting up large firms into smaller units which are not captured by the 
legislation,192 and through processes of acquisitions and mergers where workers are largely 
unprotected in practice.193 A loophole in the retrenchment laws is the use of voluntary 
retirement schemes which are often voluntary in name only.194 Some businesses simply 
relocate to areas where enforcement is more lax.195 But generally speaking, as we have noted, 
enforcement is weak everywhere.  
It goes without saying that this state of affairs has important implications for the ‘protective’ 
profile in Indian labour law. The evidence suggests among other things that most workers do 
not receive the legislated minimum wage,196 and that legislation designed to regulate hours of 
work, and health and safety and many other conditions are either ignored or not enforced.197 
Notwithstanding the purpose of the Contract Labour Act, contract labour is rife throughout 
many of India’s most important industries.198  
All of this suggests that the ‘protective’ qualities of Indian labour law are largely ineffective 
when measured across the Indian economy as a whole. Nevertheless this has not interfered 
with the widespread perception that the overly protective nature of Indian labour law has been 
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191 See generally Sundar, above n. 52, at p. 31. 
192 Hill, above n. 15; Warnecke and de Ruyter, above n. 137. 
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a major factor in the evident failure of the Indian formal economy to adapt and develop in the 
globalised world economy, especially the formal sector.199 
One major line of investigation has concerned the economic consequences associated with 
the introduction of the series of amendments to the law during the 1970s and 1980s which, as 
noted,200 provided for stronger employment protections for workers employed in larger firms. 
In this line of amendments, the introduction in 1976 of Chapter VB into the Industrial 
Disputes Act 1947, in particular, introduced quite stringent rules against layoffs and 
retrenchments in firms with 300201 or more workers.202 
Early studies, including those by Fallon and Lucas,203 Nagaraj,204 and Bhalotra,205 suggested 
that these reforms were associated with labour ‘hoarding’ and reduced labour demand, which 
in turn hampered employment growth, even while economic growth was accelerating in 
company with productivity growth.206 The study of manufacturing employment by Fallon and 
Lucas over the period 1959/60 to 1981/82,207 reported that the 1976 amendment was 
associated with a 17.6 per cent decline in employment across the sectors examined in the 
study, and that the decline in employment in the larger establishments covered by the 
provisions had not been associated with a proportionate increase in employment in smaller 
firms exempted from the law’s coverage.208 A later study by the same researchers arrived at 
broadly similar conclusions.209 Other studies also attributed negative employment effects to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 See above n. 84 and associated discussion. 
200 See above nn. 74-77 and associated discussion. 
201 The Act was expanded to cover firms employing 100 or more workers by Act 46 in 1982. 
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member countries other than Portugal and the Czech Republic: see Dougherty, above n. 119, at p. 303. 
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209 Fallon and Lucas, above n. 94. 
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the severity of India’s employment security laws, albeit through different arguments to those 
employed in the Fallon and Lucas studies.210 
Some other studies have sought to examine the economic impact of Indian labour law more 
broadly. For example, a study by Besley and Burgess211 constructed a measure of key State 
amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, covering matters such as strikes and 
lockouts, the adjudication of industrial disputes, closure of firms, layoffs, retrenchments, 
bargaining and union membership, according to whether they were ‘pro-worker’ or ‘pro-
employer’. The study drew the conclusion that those Indian States which had introduced ‘pro-
worker’ reforms had experienced significantly lower levels of growth in output, employment 
and investment, and had also experienced lower levels of productivity, when compared with 
States that had not done so. They also found that there were significant increases in 
employment in the ‘unregistered’ sector, and increases in urban poverty in those States which 
had pursued ‘pro-worker’ reforms.212  
Although the Besley and Burgess study has come in for some criticism on methodological 
grounds,213 it has nevertheless provided the direction for much subsequent empirical research. 
This work has confirmed that States with ‘pro-employer’ legal reforms experienced faster 
growth in employment and output than did those States with no reforms or with ‘pro-worker’ 
reforms.214 It also points to the fact that other liberalising reforms, such as de-licensing and 
tariff reforms, work much more effectively where they are coupled with pro-employer 
amendments to labour law provisions.215 Finally, work by Ahsan and Pages, rather than 
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Evidence from India’ Working Paper No. 12031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA. , 
2003. 
215 See, for example, Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti, above n. 214, R. Hasan, D. Mitra and K. V. 
Ramaswamy, ‘Trade Reforms, Labor Regulations, and Labor-Demand Elasticities: Empirical Evidence from 
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aggregating all labour law constraints, has tested for the possibility of a differential impact of 
employment security and dispute settlement laws.216 This research found that reforms in both 
areas of labour law were associated with negative effects on employment and output. 
Moreover, the research also showed that where labour law reforms at the State level acted to 
increase the costs of resolving industrial disputes, this magnified the negative effects of more 
stringent employment security laws. 
Taken as a whole, then, there is considerable evidence in some research to suggest that the 
perceived rigidities in the Indian labour law system have had, and are continuing to have, 
negative consequences for the development of the Indian economy.217 On the other hand, as 
we have noted, there are serious doubts on the effectiveness of much of the Indian labour 
market regulation, even across the formalised sectors of the economy,218 and, at the same 
time, much of the research is limited in scope, and the outcomes subject to question and 
debate.219  
The	  Settlement	  of	  Industrial	  Disputes	  
	  
While it seems that the Royal Commission on Labour had anticipated in the 1930s that 
industrial peace in India would be constructed on the development of strong trade unions and 
collective bargaining,220 this was never an accepted policy direction for Indian employers, 
who continued trenchantly to resist union recognition and legislation supporting that 
objective. Amendments to the Trade Unions Act, which provided for a procedure for 
compulsory recognition, were never given legal effect.221 Running parallel with the law on 
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trade unions were the laws pertaining to industrial disputes, which began with the Trade 
Disputes Act 1929, and were followed by the Bombay Trade Disputes (Conciliation) Act 
1934, the wartime legislation, and ultimately the Central government’s Trade Disputes Act 
1947 which consolidated the general governance approach to Indian industrial relations. 
The main point of all of this legislation was not, as we noted earlier, to promote industrial 
peace through collective bargaining. Rather it was an attempt to stifle the development of 
industrial disputes and their prosecution through strikes and other forms of direct action, 
firstly by limiting the right to strike, and secondly by empowering government directly, and 
through its institutions, to seize control of emergent industrial conflict and orient it towards 
settlement or suppression. Its state powers in this respect were largely unrestricted. We can 
now turn to look more closely at the detail of these regulations, before attempting to make an 
assessment of the system’s impact on Indian industrial relations. 
As we noted in Section 2 of the paper, the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is the core piece of 
Central government legislation underpinning the industrial relations system of India.222 As is 
the case with so much of Indian labour law, the Act applies only selectively to particular 
types of workers, and in particular industries and establishments.223 In general terms the Act 
establishes a multi-tiered industrial dispute resolution system comprising three stages: 
negotiation, conciliation and adjudication.  
A principal objective of the Act, at least in formal terms, is to encourage the resolution of 
disputes through negotiation between the parties. Most collective agreements entered into 
between unions and employers arise from conciliated settlements pursuant to s. 12 (3) of the 
Industrial Disputes Act and are binding upon all of the present and future employees of the 
employer parties to the settlement including non-union members. Voluntary (i.e. non-
conciliated) settlements, on the other hand are binding on only the individual signatories to 
the particular agreement concerned.224 However, the Industrial Disputes Act imposes no legal 
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duty upon employers to bargain with trade unions, and as a consequence collective 
bargaining is not a convention in dispute settlement across Indian industry generally. Various 
forms of machinery have been introduced into the legislation in attempts to prompt other 
forms of workplace negotiations or consultations. For example the Act mandates the 
establishment of Works Committees in workplaces with 100 or more employees. These 
Committees of 20 members may be comprised of equal numbers of employer and employee 
representatives or of less employer than employee representatives (there may not be more 
employer than employee members), and are charged with the duty of promoting and 
preserving good workplace relations.225 A further example is found in the establishment of in-
house machinery for the resolution of individual employment grievances in establishments of 
20 or more workers.226 Neither the Works Committees, nor the ‘Grievance Redressal 
Machinery’, are intended to obstruct the rights of unions to collective bargaining or the rights 
of individual workers to raise an industrial dispute.227 
A second approach to dispute settlement in the Industrial Disputes Act includes the processes 
of conciliation and voluntary arbitration.228 Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the 
government may appoint Conciliation Officers to mediate in or promote the settlement of 
industrial disputes in specific areas and industries.229 It may also appoint Conciliation 
Boards.230 Where it apprehends that an industrial dispute exists, the Appropriate Government 
may refer such dispute to a Conciliation Board. Alternatively, the parties to a dispute may 
apply jointly or separately for a reference to a Board, and if the government is satisfied that 
the disputants represent a majority of each party it is under an obligation to make the 
reference accordingly.231 There is also scope under the Act for the parties voluntarily to refer 
the dispute to arbitration.232  
In the case of collective disputes there is no automatic path in the conciliation process to a 
supervised settlement. The Conciliation Officer or Board may settle the dispute, but in the 
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event that it cannot do so it must send a ‘failure’ report to the government. The government 
retains the discretion to decide if the case should be referred to a Labour Court or Tribunal 
for adjudication. Strict limitations apply to the taking of industrial action while these 
processes are in train.233 
The Act also provides for the government to establish Labour Courts and Industrial 
Tribunals234 for dealing with industrial disputes,235 and for it to constitute Courts of Inquiry 
‘for inquiring into any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to an industrial 
dispute’.236 As we have noted, generally speaking the government has a controlling discretion 
in relation to these matters. In the event of a failure to settle the dispute through the 
conciliation stage, the government may refer the dispute to a court or a tribunal. Alternatively 
the parties to a dispute may apply to the government jointly or separately for a reference of a 
dispute to a court or tribunal, and, as is the case with the conciliation process, if the 
government is satisfied that the persons applying represent the majority of each party, it must 
make the reference accordingly.237 The government is not required under the legislation to 
give the parties any hearing when exercising its discretion either to refer or not to refer a 
dispute to a court or tribunal. One major exception to the government’s discretion on 
adjudication concerns the dismissal or retrenchment of individual workers. In such cases a 
2010 amendment has provided workers with direct access to a Labour Court or Industrial 
Tribunal without the requirement of a government reference.238 Once again, the various 
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processes of adjudication under the Act are accompanied by strict limitations on the rights of 
all parties to engage in industrial action.239 
If, as we have noted in earlier discussion, Indian labour law is not effectively ‘protective’ of 
Indian labour, the question remains whether it has been more successful in the second of its 
core objectives; i.e. in facilitating the efficient settlement of industrial disputes and thus 
constraining the level of industrial action in the day-to-day affairs of Indian industrial 
relations? 
Viewed over its lengthy period of operation, Indian labour law does not appear to have been 
very successful in engineering industrial peace. While India’s law does not prohibit industrial 
action per se, the strongly interventionist role of the state, coupled with the highly restrictive 
and uncertain240 nature of the law on strikes has given rise to a perception that it is a 
disordered, disruptive and heavily politicised dispute settlement process,241 with strong 
negative implications for the Indian economy.242 Thus scholars have noted the comparatively 
high number of working days lost through strikes in India,243 the levels of union militancy 
generally,244 and the general failure of the dispute settlement mechanisms and other legal 
processes to resolve these problems.245 While there has been a general decline in the numbers 
of disputes and strikes in recent decades,246 and a consequent decline in the numbers of 
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working days lost due to such action, the impact of this has to a considerable degree been 
offset by a corresponding increase in the numbers of employer lockouts.247  
Much of the focus in the literature points to administrative weaknesses in the adjudication 
system described earlier.248 One major concern is the sheer volume of disputes to be dealt 
with by the labour courts and tribunals, which leads to inordinate delays at both the referral 
and settlement stages of the conciliation and adjudicative process.249 A second problem 
concerns the potential for misuse of the dispute settlement mechanisms. Some scholars have 
argued that the subjective nature of the referral powers in the legislation has created the 
conditions through which they may be used for political and other extraneous (or corrupt)  
purposes, and that in fact such practices do take place, resulting in unjust outcomes for unions 
and labour in particular.250 One obvious consequence of this is that the number of collective 
interest disputes coming into the adjudication system has declined substantially in the past 
two decades as workers tend to accept what the employer has to offer rather than risk taking 
direct action.251 Taken as a whole, then, the weight of evidence suggests that the dispute 
settlement process in Indian labour law engenders industrial conflict rather than promotes 
industrial peace,252 or at least secures labour compliance under highly unfavourable terms.  
One final point to note in this discussion of dispute settlement is the impact that the Indian 
labour law system has had upon the Indian trade union movement. As we have noted at 
various points throughout this paper, trade unions have not been as strongly legally 
incorporated into the regulatory system as in many other countries, and as a consequence 
their influence through collective bargaining and through the various other dispute settlement 
mechanisms has been comparatively muted. One illustrative example of this is found in the 
impact that the delays and costs associated with the disputes referral system has had in cases 
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of anti-union victimisation and discrimination by employers.253 Perhaps as a consequence of 
this legal disadvantage, in industrial terms unions are very weak. They are also marked by 
very low membership,254 multiplicity, fragmentation, rivalry,255 and are intensely 
politicised256 partly as a result of provisions of the Trade Unions Act 1926 which permit 
executive members of trade unions to be drawn from external, politically allied, bodies. As a 
result, most of the power of Indian trade unions, which recently has been in decline,257 has 
been derived from their connections with political parties and policies. At the same time, this 
has made them vulnerable to political appropriation.258   
	  
4.	  Conclusion	  
	  
Thinking about labour law in India requires us to think not merely about the application of a 
set of legal or regulatory conventions governing labour in a particular society. It also requires 
us to think about what ‘labour law’ might mean in varying economic and social contexts. In 
certain respects Indian labour law is much like the labour law of developed industrial 
societies. It has extensive legislation providing for minimum standards of employment, social 
security, occupational health and safety and so on. Its labour law legalises trade unions and 
their activities, and provides a framework for the settlement of industrial disputes. It legalises 
industrial action in pursuit of collective interests. Yet, as we have seen, formally the labour 
law of India covers only a very small percentage of the Indian workforce, and even among 
that cohort the law’s application in practice is lax to say the least. Neither of the two principal 
objects of the labour law system identified in this paper appears to have been met in practice. 
To all intents and purposes then, this is a non-functioning system. 
If we were to adopt a fairly conventional approach to labour law, i.e. if we were to confine 
our inquiry to the usual parameters of labour law subject matter, it would follow that our 
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investigation would extend to a number of consequent questions and issues. These might 
include an examination of the limited coverage of Indian labour law amongst classes of 
workers, business establishments and particular occupations, and the reasons for those 
limitations; the weaknesses and failings of the enforcement system; and how to extend the 
idea of labour law to what are labelled ‘precarious’, ‘marginal’ or ‘atypical’ labour.  
However, in our opinion such an approach would fail to deal adequately with the problems 
identified. India is a ‘quasi’-industrialised society. It has a rapidly growing economy, but it is 
not industrialising in a way that might have been anticipated following independence.259 If 
there is to be an ongoing international and comparative discussion in labour law, particularly 
one involving major nations such as China, India and Indonesia and so on, we cannot shape 
the discussion about labour law in so confined a manner. We cannot assume that developing 
countries will necessarily industrialise in ways similar to the pattern set by earlier 
developers.260 Some further line of investigation by labour lawyers is needed in order to 
discover what truly is 'regulating' 'labour' in India.  
One such line of inquiry is suggested in the form of the novel social protection initiatives 
being introduced in India. These include the Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme which is designed to provide a minimum income through a right to work 
guarantee to the very poor,261 and the Unorganized Sector Workers' Social Security Bill 2008 
which is designed, eventually, to extend a social welfare network of schemes embodying life 
and disability cover, health and maternity benefits, old age protection and so on to the 60 
million or so workers in the unorganised sectors of the economy and their families. These 
kinds of laws and regulations are not typically part of labour law discourse; they tend to be 
included at the margins, if at all. Yet, the study of labour law in India suggests that we should 
be looking at a multi-faceted approach to labour regulation. Where formal or conventional 
ideas of labour law are ineffective or irrelevant, something else is relevant to labour's 
condition. In India that includes the extensive influence of custom, caste, religion and class in 
determining the rights of labour and the protections extended to it. This suggests that a new 
approach is warranted. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 See C. K. Johri, ‘Industrialism and Industrial Relations in India: The Task Ahead’ (1990) 25 Indian Journal 
of Industrial Relations 230. 
260 Furthermore, although it is not immediately germane to our present discussion, it cannot be assumed that 
presently developed nations will continue to be industrialised in the same way in the future. This issue has 
general implications for the regulation of labour markets everywhere. 
261 This legislative scheme was originally introduced in the form of the National Rural Guarantee Act 2005, but 
was renamed in 2009. 
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